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This thesis is concerned about firm’s merger and competition behavior in modern 
economies in which networks are ever-more important and how to optimize merger 
policy  when  network  externalities  present.  As  a  demand-side  economics  of  scale, 
network externalities bring benefit to consumers through merger and acquisition if the 
products  from  different  firms  are  incompatible.  Hence,  a  merger,  which  is  both 
socially  optimal  and  privately  profitable,  can  exist  without  considering  the 
supply-side  economies  of  scale.  Merger  policy  should  be  revised  to  be  able  to 
recognize these “good” mergers and encourage them. Firm’s incentive to merge is 
enlarged by network effect because merged entities can benefit from a larger network, 
which increases the demand for their product. Moreover, merger and acquisition in 
network world give the merged entities an advantage in competition over the firms 
who stand outside the merger. One of the explanations for this advantage is merged 
entity may inherit indirect network resources, for example complementary products 
producers, from all merged firms, since the mobile of these resources are costly and 
slow. Acquiring more firms brings more indirect network resources to merged entity, 
which makes the products of merged entity more valuable to the consumers. Thus the 
merged entity can charge a higher price or squeeze more market share. Merged entity 
can obtain locked-in consumers from all merged firms is another explanation of the 
advantage. For some information products, such as TV subscription, internet access 
and mobile phone service, consumers need to sign a contract with the service provider 
and are locked by these contracts for a fixed period. Merged entity may inherit these 
locked-in consumers and show a larger initial network to the consumers who are not 
locked at the beginning of the competition. Social planner should be cautious to the 
merger  in  network  world  because  network externalities  magnify  the  power  of  the 
merger, which may be utilized by the firms to get dominant position. 
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Many of the so-called industrial nations are experiencing a transition to information-
based economy, in the sense that ICE (information, communications, and entertainment)
comprises an ever-greater share of national economy (Shapiro and Varian 1999). In the
"New Economy", the economics of networks takes on greater importance in comparison
with traditional economies of scale. Many networks are self-evident: the telephone net-
work, the network of fax machines, the credit-card acceptance network, the Internet etc.
The role of networks in the information economy is even larger than it might appear at the
beginning, because of the presence of many virtual networks: the network of users of Apple
Macintosh computers, the network of owners of compact disk machines, and the network
of users of Microsoft software.
It has been recognized that networks can raise problems for competition policy. But
as yet, little attention has been paid to how merger policy should be applied to networks.
The need for rigorous research on this topic is acute. There have been a number of high-
pro￿le mergers in the information sector. A number of mergers have been allowed: Lotus
and IBM, Nynex and Bell Atlantic, Microsoft and Hotmail, WebTV, and Vermeer. How-
ever, several prominent mergers have been blocked altogether, and been subject to substan-
tial modi￿cations competition authorities.
In 1991, Borland International announced its intention to acquire Ashton-Tate. The
￿rms were two leading suppliers of personal computer based ￿relational database￿ pro-
grams. This case was an important early test of how mergers in the personal computer
software industry would be treated by the anti-trust agencies in the US. The DoJ (US De-
partment of Justice) expressed competition concerns that the merged company would be
dominant in the market for relational database software. As a result, Borland agreed to
issue FoxPro, a competitor, a license to the dBase code.
In 1994, Adobe announced its intention to acquire Aldus. The ￿rms sold the leading
brands of professional illustration software. To prevent the creation of a dominant position
in this market, the US Federal Trade Commission required the merged ￿rm to divest the
software owned by Aldus to a third ￿rm.
1In 1994, Microsoft proposed to acquire Intuit, the owner of the leading personal ￿-
nancial software package. Microsoft’s Money product performed many of the same func-
tions. The acquisition was challenged by the DoJ, again on the grounds that the merged
￿rm would be dominant in a particular product market. In response to the DoJ’s challenge,
Microsoft abandoned the acquisition.
These are just three examples. Detail of these examples and other examples can be
found in Shapiro’s (2000) work. In each of these cases, the policy-makers have acted either
to prevent or to modify the merger. The question is whether these are the correct decisions?
In information economy, the consumer’s welfare not only depends on the quality of
the products and the price, but also depends on the size of the products’ network. Clearly,
people value a large networks more than a small network because it is less possible to meet
compatibility problem. Merger between two networks may create a larger network, which
makes merged entity’s products more valuable to consumers without any additional price
reduction or quality improvement. If the cost saving of merger is a kind of supply-side
economies of scale, this network effect can be similarly de￿ned as demand-side economies
of scale. Merger, despite increasing concentration in an industry, may nevertheless be
associated with a rise in welfare. Thus, it seems that the social planner should approve more
merger applications in network economy. However, we know that demand-side economies
of scale create positive feedback: a tendency for the strong to get stronger and the weak
to get weaker. Consequently, the merged entity may use their initial advantage to pursue
dominant market status, which may ￿nally be harmful to social welfare.
Another thing that needs to raise attention is some network externalities do not di-
rectly come from the products. Instead, they come from complementary products market.
A larger network will attract more complementary products supplier and increase competi-
tion, which will ￿nally reduce the price and bene￿t the consumers. These indirect network
externalities may take effect similar as direct network externalities. However, in most of the
time, they are more similar to a kind of resource that has been ￿xed to a speci￿c product,
2since the ￿rms in complementary market are costly to switch from supplying one product
to another product. The merged entity can inherit these recourses from all of the ￿rms who
are involved in the merger and get an advantage in the competition compared with other
￿rms who stand outside the merger. This also supports the idea that the merger in network
economy should be more restricted by social planner than in traditional economy.
Many literatures have discussed or emphasized how these characteristics of the net-
work effect the market structure in typical industries, such as ￿nance (Noia 1998), telecom-
munication (Baranes and Flochel 2003), entertainment (Matteucci 2003), internet (Cre-
mer, Rey and Tirole 1992, Baranes and Cortade 2004) and transportations (Brueckner and
Spiller 1992). In this thesis, we are attempting to develop a model without making any
speci￿cation in a certain industry environment, reveal some general rules about the merger
behavior of the ￿rms and provide some propositions for the social planner to consider in a
general network world.
This thesis focuses on the following questions:
When is merger privately pro￿table if there are network externalities present?
Obviously, ￿rms will not undertake mergers that are privately unpro￿table. This
means that mergers that reach the attention of policy-makers are a sub-set of all possible
mergers. Salant et al. (1983) show that, when ￿rms with equal market shares compete in
outputs (the industry is a symmetric Cournot oligopoly), with linear demand and constant
marginal costs (so that there are no synergies), a merger is pro￿table only if it involves at
least 80% of the ￿rms in the industry. An implication of this result is that, in the absence
of synergies, any merger proposal considered by a policy-maker is likely to involve a large
increase in industry concentration. This means, ￿rstly that there should be a general policy
bias against mergers; and secondly, that this bias can be overturned only if synergies are
strong enough. If we detail the acquisition process, we may get some more counterintuitive
merger threshold without considering synergies. Kamien and Zang (1990) show that, in
an acquisition model with linear demand function, merger equilibrium only exists for an
industry with no more than two competitors.
3Do these conclusions carry over when network externalities are present? In the ￿rst
chapter of the thesis, we have found that in the same setting as Salant et al. (1983), small-
scale merger can be pro￿table if the network externalities are suf￿ciently strong. Hence,
a pro￿table merger need not a sharp increase in concentration. The intuition is simple:
merging ￿rms can bene￿t from having a larger network, which increases the demand for
their product. This effect can outweigh the other effects identi￿ed by Salant et al., in a way
similar to supply-side synergies.
In the second capture, we focus on answering this question under the condition that
only indirect network effect presents. Based on the work of Kamien and Zang (1990), we
￿nd that merged nash equilibrium is easier to exist than Kamien and Zang’s declaration
if the ￿rms may inherit indirect network resource. The intuition is, after inheriting indi-
rect network resources from the ￿rms acquired, buyer in the acquisition can afford more
payment to the seller, so the merger can occur in a more general market condition. .
When there exist multiple equilibra?
The analysis will be more complicated because of the presence of multiple equilibria.
Network externalities naturally give rise to many possible outcomes. These outcomes are
driven by different ￿expectations￿. If an individual expects, for example, everyone else to
buy Firm A’s product, then that individual has a strong incentive to buy from Firm A. If
everyone thinks in this way, then Firm A becomes dominant, and its competitor (Firm B)
suffers. Ontheotherhand, ifeveryoneexpectsFirmB tobedominant, thenthisexpectation
can also be self-ful￿lling.
If we don’t know the location of the equilibrium after the merger or there exist too
many possibilities, it will be dif￿cult for us to carry out further analysis. In this thesis,
we assume the consumer’s expectation is full ￿lled by ￿rms and ￿rms are aware of this
when they make output decisions. This means the consumer’s expectation is fully reacted
with ￿rms’ output and the network utility function can be directly added to the demand
functiontosolvetheequilibrium. Sincethenetworkutilityfunctioncanbeacurve, multiple
equilibria still exist in some cases. However, we ￿nd that the multiple equilibra only exist
4when the network effect is strong enough. The intuition is the traditional reaction function
of ￿rms must be bended to a certain level to get more than one cross point. In this thesis,
we limit our analysis in the world, in which the network effect is relatively week. In most
of the chapters of this thesis, we assume the network utility is a linear function bx, and
b < 0:5. This assumption eliminate the possibility of multiple equilibria and greatly reduce
the dif￿culty of analysis. We believe most of characteristics of network world are well kept
under this assumption, because products with extremely strong network effect are rare.
Multiple equilibra and more general utility function can be left as an interesting future
work.
When is a merger socially optimal if network externalities present?
The next issue to investigate is whether those mergers which are privately pro￿table
are, or can be, socially optimal. We must therefore determine the effects of merger on con-
sumer surplus. There will be two countervailing effects. The standard effect is that merger
increases industry concentration, which generally will be bad for consumer surplus. The
new effect, arising from network externalities, is that merger can create larger networks,
which, other things equal, is good for consumer surplus.
There are many factors that determine the balance between these two effects. The
￿rst one is the strength of network externalities. The second is how concentrated this mar-
ket is. Degree of compatibility between competing networks also matters. In the extreme
case in which compatibility is perfect, merger clearly makes no difference to overall net-
work bene￿ts. The concentration effect then dominates, and (in the absence of supply-side
effects) any merger is likely to be socially harmful. In this thesis, we mainly consider the
other extreme case ￿￿when all ￿rms’ products are entirely incompatible. In this cir-
cumstance, merger can surely raise consumer surplus by increasing the size of networks
(the main characteristic we want to keep) and the model is simpli￿ed without considering
degree of compatibility.
Does the merged entity get an advantage in the competition?
5As the merged entity may bene￿t from the reduction of the competitors, all the other
￿rms, who are not involved in the merger, can get bene￿t as well. Since the merger is
costly, ￿rms all prefer to stand outside merger and encourage others to get into it if the
reduction of competition is the only effect of merger. However, in network world, there
exists a tendency that: the strong (merged entity) to get stronger and the weak (the ￿rms
standing outside merger) to get weaker. Thus, there must exist some mechanisms that give
the merged entity an advantage in the competition.
The consumers will always consider the size of network when they are planning
to purchase. Generally speaking, the merged entity will show a larger existing network
than separate ones. This is because some of old consumers are locked by the contract
and the merged entity may inherit these locked-in consumers from every ￿rm who are
involved in the merger. The new consumers form their expectation of the size of network
according to the number of these locked-in consumers, so the merged entity shows an
advantage. Chapter three of this thesis gives out a preliminary attempt to model this effect.
We assume a duopoly market with a given asymmetric initial locked-in consumers to each
￿rm and show that the ￿rm with more initial locked-in consumers indeed obtains a relative
advantage. The merger process hasn’t been considered in Chapter three, but our result can
be easily applied to analyze a merger case. The only difference is we need to treat the size
of the initial locked-in consumers as an exogenous variable when we analyze a merger.
Another origin of this advantage is addressed in Chapter two of this thesis, in which
we assume ￿rms may inherit indirect network resource from every component. The more
￿rms the merged entity acquired, the more indirect network resources he may control.
The consumers obviously prefer a product with more indirect network externalities (more
complementary products supplier), so the merged entity may obtain a relative advantage in
the competition. In this chapter, the direct network effect is not considered, but we will get
similar result when both the direct and indirect network externalities take effect because
these two forces are in the same direction. Moreover, we also reveal that the larger ￿rm is
easier to acquire smaller ￿rm than the smaller ￿rm to acquire larger one in an acquisition
model. It is because the large ￿rm can afford more acquisition payment than the small
6one. This may hint some mechanism to explain how the market goes from an asymmetric
structure to a monopoly.
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8Chapter 1
Horizontal Merger with Network Externalities
and Incompatible Products
Abstract
In this study, we analyzed the horizontal merger between ￿rms in oligopoly competition
with incompatible products and network externalities. The model is based on Katz and
Shapiro’s network externalities model (1985), but allow the consumer’s expectations to
react with the ￿rms’ outputs. We reveal that the ￿rms have more incentive to merge if
they produce network products. For the social planner’s problem, we ￿nd that mergers
may increase social welfare without the consideration of synergies and we develop some
suf￿cient conditions for the merger to be socially desirable when general form network
utility presents. As a special case, we applied our model to a linear network utility world,
revealingthatprivateandsociallydesirablemergersmayexist. Thesuf￿cientandnecessary
conditions for the existence of such a "good" merger were also obtained for the merger
regulators to consider.
91.1 Introduction
Merger policy has been traditionally recognized as a central concern that horizontal merg-
ers (between ￿rms operating the same product and geographic market) can decrease com-
petition and hence social welfare. To avoid a potential monopoly and great reduction of
the competition, mergers are required to be reviewed and authorized by the industry reg-
ulation department of the government before they may be carried out. Roughly speaking,
only a merger that does not increase the concentration in the industry by very much, or
that allows the industry concentration to remain low even after the merger, will be permit-
ted (e.g., the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) 1984 Merger Guidelines, which
speci￿ed explicit concentration thresholds when determining whether a merger is to be
allowed). However, for different market structures, different product characteristics and
different times, the consequences of the merger may change the short-term and long-term
social welfare greatly (Fridolfsson and Stennek 2000, Buccirossi 2008).
Using a simple rule as a guideline to judge all merger cases is a weakness and may
be misleading for the social planner, especially in the ￿New Economy￿ (Shapiro 2000). An
important reason that the old merger policy should be reconsidered by social planners is
that mergers may bring some positive effect to the consumers in network industries. For
example, fewermobilephoneserviceproviderssuggeststhatconsumershavelessofchance
to pay the cross net fee. More speci￿cally, the merger between MSN and Yahoo Message
suggests you only need to register with one service and can use it to send messages to users
in either company.
As a widely accepted rule, large networks offer more value to users than small ones:
customers value a popular product or network more than an unpopular one. When a con-
sumer gets more people to join the same network or use the same product, he/she may have
a chance to obtain an additional bene￿t. This creates a particular form of economy of scale
often denoted as "network externalities". In the information industry, although horizontal
mergers between ￿rms could reduce the competition, consumers may also have a chance to
enjoy larger network externalities. It is hard to say whether a merger is good or not with-
10out considering the balance between good and bad. We can imagine such a "good" merger:
a merger which lets the ￿rms squeeze more pro￿ts from the consumers and, at the same
time, the consumers are also happy to accept this merger since they receive bene￿ts from
network externalities, which may offset their losses from the higher price after the merger.
This ￿good￿ merger increases social welfare and is welcome by both ￿rms and consumers.
The merger policy should consequently be revised to identify these "good" mergers and
encourage them.
A ￿good￿ merger must ￿rstly be a pro￿table merger to the ￿rms involved. Salant et
al. (1983) revealed that mergers were only privately pro￿table if they caused a suf￿ciently
large decrease in concentration. This illustrates that mergers in need of attention are only
a sub-set of all potential mergers. Our ￿rst goal in this study is therefore to determine this
sub-set with the effect of network externalities. The literature has revealed that Salant’s
condition, where over 80% of the ￿rms must get involved in the merger to make the merger
pro￿table, should be modi￿ed if other conditions or limitations are added to the model.
Perry and Porter (1985) pointed out that Salant’s model may underestimate the probabil-
ity of a merger if there is a limit of the output capacities or shortage of capital. Cheung
(1992) illustrated that Salant’s threshold may be relaxed to 50% if the demand satisfying
the marginal revenue of the industry is decreasing. Fauli-Oller (1997) further investigated
Cheung’s work and found that the probability of mergers may depend on the degree of
concavity of the demand function.
In Cournot competition, ￿rms’ outputs increase after the merger, so every consumer
should receive more or less bene￿t from the merger because of the network externalities.
This bene￿t allows the ￿rms to charge a higher price to consumers and squeeze out more
pro￿ts. Thus, the incentive of the ￿rms to merger may increase if the network effect is
considered. For different forms of the utility function of network externalities, the demand
function may be distorted to a linear function with a smaller slope, or a concave function.
The degree of relaxation of Salant’s condition may depend upon how large the network
effect is, which is coincident with Fauli-Oller’s (1997) declaration. On the other hand,
this result also provides insight that the pro￿table merger does not need a sharp increase
11in concentration in the network world, which would normally harm consumer welfare. A
more gentle increase in market concentration will be easier to accept for the consumers,
who need to balance the losses from the increase of the price and the bene￿ts from the
increase in network externalities.
The second step of this study is to provide a further narrowing of the candidate merg-
ers we ￿nd in the ￿rst step. This means we need to pick up the mergers which may increase
social welfare from all the mergers pro￿table to the ￿rms. Generally speaking, the greater
the network effect is, the more bene￿t the consumers may receive and the larger the possi-
bility that we can ￿nd a ￿good￿ merger.
It is easy to identify whether the consumer’s welfare increases or not if all ￿rms’
products are compatible. In a fully compatible case, the network externalities only de-
pend upon the total output from all ￿rms. Thus, the consumer’s welfare increases when the
merger increases the total output and decreases when the merger decreases the total output.
In this thesis, we focus on the situation where the ￿rm’s products are completely incom-
patible. The partial compatibility problem can be a future work and solved under a similar
framework.
In the literature, the social welfare of the merger and market concentration has been
analyzed extensively (Salant et al. 1983, Ferrell and Shapiro 1990a, 1990b, Gaudet and
Salant 1991). Ferrell and Shapiro (1990b) introduced synergies into the competition model
and indicated that the merger may be socially desirable if the supply-side economies of
scale are strong enough. It is easy to see that the synergy has many similar characteristics
to network externalities. With the spirit of Ferrell and Shapiro (1990b)’s work, we can view
network externalities as a demand-side economies of scale, and obtain similar conclusions
that the merger may be socially desirable if the demand-side economies of scale, or the
network effect, is strong enough. The possibility that vertical mergers can raise social
welfare in a network world has been recognized in recent literature. Inspired by the work
of Katz and Shapiro (1994), Jamison (2002) and Weisman (2005) have conducted work
revealing the suf￿cient conditions for a vertical merger to be socially desirable. However,
their analysis was based on the merger between the ￿rms who served multiple markets and
12their network externalities comes from the internalization of other market’s products. In
our thesis, we primarily consider the horizontal merger in which all ￿rms only compete
in a single market and the network effect only connects with the ￿rms’ output in a single
product line.
Before we begin the discussion of merger and social welfare, it is crucial that we
create a simple and ef￿cient way to model network effect. Thus, in the ￿rst part of this
chapter, we spend a whole section discussing the modelling of network externalities and
the possible equilibrium under our model. One of the most successful models of network
externalities to date has been provided by Katz and Shapiro (1985). They developed a
static oligopoly Cournot Model of competition with network effects. Most of the other lit-
erature (found in the survey paper of Farrell and Klemperer (2004) and the book of Shapiro
and Varian (1999)) addresses the characteristics of the network effect based on Katz and
Shapiro’s work. In their model, they assumed the expectations of consumers were ful￿lled
and introduced a concave utility function to describe the network utility. Katz and Shapiro
predicted that, unlike the traditional Cournot Model, there may exist multiple equilibria
for some utility functions because of the distortion of the reaction functions, even though
a perfect symmetric assumption to each ￿rm was given. This brings some dif￿culties to
policy makers because of the uncertainty of the ex-post status of the merger activities. Al-
though the authorities may know how the market works at the moment, it is hard for them
to predict which equilibrium will be played by the ￿rms in the future.
In our model, we assume the expectated output of the consumers will perfectly
change with the change in the ￿rm’s real output, rather than assuming that the output of
the ￿rms has no effect on the expectations of the consumers. This modi￿cation enables
us to more precisely simulate the reactions between the ￿rms and consumers. We ￿nd
that the asymmetric equilibria only existed in a limited number of cases. When the net-
work effect is very strong, there is no equilibrium and when the network effect is relatively
weak, only a symmetric equilibrium exists. In this thesis, we restrict our discussion to the
case where the network effect is gentle and only a symmetric equilibrium exists, which
avoid the complexity of the selection of multiple equilibria. Although our conclusions are
13compromised on some level, most of the new features that are bought by the network ex-
ternalities to merger are maintained. The conclusions update our understanding of mergers
in the network world. We also provide a list of rules about the reaction functions between
the ￿rms and clarify the features of network competition that are not pointed out by Katz
and Shapiro’s model. This makes a virtual framework for the discussion in the following
sections.
In Section 1.2, we will describe the model, attempt to provide new features of the
￿rms’ reaction function and derive one of the necessary conditions for the existence of
multiple equilibria. In Section 1.3, we will discuss the ￿rm’s merger incentives and social
welfare in a general utility function context. In Section 1.4, we will introduce a linear util-
ity function and give out suf￿cient and necessary conditions for the existence of a "good"
mergerinlinearutilitycircumstances. Wewillalsoillustratearoughwaytoidentify"good"
mergers for the social planners under the network environment. Section 1.5 is the conclu-
sion, but also includes future research suggestions.
141.2 Network Externalities with Cournot Competition
1.2.1 The Competition Model with Network Externalities
We investigate an oligopoly market with n ￿rms. These ￿rms produce homogeneous prod-
ucts and chose their outputs to maximize their pro￿ts. The products produced by the same
￿rm were compatible, but were not compatible to the products produced by the other ￿rms.
This suggests that if a consumer chose a product from one of the ￿rms, he/she may bene￿t
from an increase in the number of consumers selecting the same ￿rm, but the change in the
output of other ￿rms will not affect his/her surplus. A consumer can choose either one or
zero units of the product from one of the ￿rms. His/her choice depends on the products that
can maximize his/her surplus. The surplus that a consumer derives from purchasing a unit
of the good depends on the number of the consumers who join the network associated with
his/her choice and his/her basic willingness of that product. When the consumers make
their decisions, they are not able to see the choices of others, so their purchases are only
based on their expectations of the network size. We assume this expectation is identical for
every consumer.
The game is played in the following sequence: ￿rst, consumers form their expec-
tations about the size of the network of each of the ￿rms. Secondly, the ￿rms play an
output competition and make an announcement about their output. When the ￿rms play the
competition game, they fully understand that consumers will change their expectations ac-
cording to their announcement. Thus, we assume that the outputs announced by the ￿rms
counted upon the possibility that consumers will change their minds. In the third step, con-
sumers revise their expectations about the size of the network of each ￿rms according to
the announcement made by the ￿rms. The ￿rms then commit to their announcement and
generate a set of prices for their products. Finally, the consumers make the purchasing de-
cision by comparing their reservation price, which is based on their revised expectations of
the network sizes, with the price set by the ￿rms.
15The game described here can be compared with Katz and Shapiro’s (1985). In Katz
and Shapiro’s model, the ￿rm’s announcement of its planned level of output has no effect
on consumers’ expectations. Their assumption may reduce the calculations, however, this
is unlikely to happen in the real world. The consumers will, more or less, change their
expectations of the each ￿rm’s network size after they have seen the announcement of
the ￿rms. In our model, we assume the consumers fully trust the announcement of the
￿rms since ￿rms will always commit to their announcement. If we use xe
i to denote the
consumers’ expectation outputs of one of the ￿rms and use xi, i 2 f1;:::;ng, to denote
the real output of this ￿rm, the assumption can be understood as @xe
i=@xi = 1 or xe
i ￿ xi.
Hence, the notation xe
i will all be writen as xi in the following thesis.
In our model, we make the assumption that consumers are heterogeneous in their
basic willingness to pay for a product without considering the network effect, but homo-
geneous in their valuation of network externalities. More speci￿cally, we use r to denote
each consumer’s basic willingness to purchase the simple product and u(xi) to denote the
network externalities that a consumer can obtain when he/she purchases Firm i’s prod-
uct. Based on the de￿nition of the positive network externalities and the characteristics of
most information products, we de￿ne that the network externality function as having the
following characteristics:
u(0) = 0;u(xi) > 0;u
0(xi) > 0;u
00(xi) 6 0
Since we assume that all the ￿rms produce incompatible goods, the network size of the
product is the output of the ￿rms who produces this product. Without further loss of gen-
erality, we assume r is uniformly distributed between minus in￿nity and 1. The uniform
distribution ensures we obtain a linear price function. The assumption that r can go to mi-
nus in￿nity gives us an always opened market which suggests we do not need to consider
the corner solution in a covered market.
When a consumer purchases a product from Firm i, he/she will be able to enjoy the
product plus the network externalities that the product brings to him and have to pay the
price the ￿rm charges. So the consumer’s surplus from purchasing a product from Firm i
16is r+ u(xi)￿pi. Since the consumers will purchase the product if and only if their surplus
is positive, r+ u(xi) ￿ pi should be positive for the consumer who makes the purchasing
decision. Hence, only the consumers with a type r that is not less than pi￿ u(xi) will enter
the market. Obviously the minimum r to make r+ u(xi) ￿ pi positive is pi ￿ u(xi). Here,
we use r￿ to denote the consumer who has no difference between purchasing the product or
not and only the consumer whose type r is not less than r￿ = pi￿ u(xi) enter the market.
In addition, pi￿ u(xi) = pj￿ u(xj), i 6= j and i;j 2 f1;:::;ng must also be true to keep
the consumers are indifferent in purchasing product between all the ￿rms and all the ￿rms
have a positive output.




xi = 1 ￿ r
￿ = 1 ￿ pi + u(xi) i 2 f1;:::;ng (1.1)
From the equation (1.1), we know that after each ￿rm sets their outputs, they will
recieve a price according to its output and the outputs of all other ￿rms, which is de￿ned
as:
pi = 1 + u(xi) ￿ z = 1 + u(xi) ￿ xi ￿
X
i6=j
xj i;j 2 f1;:::;ng (1.2)
for all i such that xi > 0.
The pro￿t of Firm i is:
￿i = pixi = xi(1 + u(xi) ￿ z) i 2 f1;:::;ng (1.3)
All the ￿rms choose their outputs to maximize pro￿ts. From the ￿rst-order condition
of the equation (1.3), we can get:
1 + u(xi) + xiu
0(xi) ￿ 2xi =
X
i6=j
xj i;j 2 f1;:::;ng (1.4)
Equation (1.4) is the reaction function of Firm i against the total output of all other
￿rms. If the total output of all other ￿rms
P
xj is given, we can get the best response of
Firm i by solving this equation.
17Proposition 1.1 If the maximum of the pro￿t function of Firm i exists for a given total
output of all other ￿rms (
P
xj), the ￿rst derivative of the pro￿t function at the maximum is
less than 1.
Corollary 1.1 If u0(xi) > 1 for any xi > 0, the maximum of the pro￿t of the ￿rms
does not exist. Firms’ outputs are only bounded by their capacity.
Corollary 1.2 If x￿
i is the output of the ￿rm i in an equilibrium, there must have
u0(x￿
i) < 1.
If we look at equation (1.2), it is clear that the price function is slightly different
to the standard Cournot model. In a standard Cournot competition, the price will always
decrease with an increase in output because of the increase in competition. However, in
this new model, the increase of the output has two effects. On the one side, it increases
the competition and causes the price to drop. On the other side, an increase in the output
can make goods more competitive because of the increasing network size. Thus, if the
bene￿t from an increase in network size is larger than the loss from the dropping price, the
￿rm will never stop to produce more products. Because u00(xi) 6 0, the increment of the
network externalities, when the ￿rm produces one more product, always decreases. Only a
small set of network functions satisfy the situation of Corollary 1.1.
1 Because we are only
interested in the situation where the equilibrium exists, the utility functions which exhibits
u0(xi) > 1 for any xi > 0 will not be discussed. This can also be seen as an reinforcement
of the de￿nition of the network utility function in our model.
2
Corollary 1.2 is a clear consequence of Proposition 1.1. According to the de￿nition
of an equilibrium, if x￿
i is an equilibrium output, it must maximize the pro￿ts of Firm i for a
given equilibrium output of all other ￿rms. Thus, we have u0(x￿
i) < 1. This corollary limits
1 There does exist such a network function in real world, such as u(xi) = bx, b > 1.
2 In some papers, condition limu0(x) = 0 as x ! 1 is added in the de￿nition of the utility function. This
condition will eliminate the situation in Corollary 1.1. However, the linear utility function is also ruled out
by this de￿ntion from all the possible utility functions. Since the linear utiltity function is the main topic we
will discuss in Section 4 of the paper, we do not introduce this condition in our de￿nition.
18the equilibrium output of the game in certain areas and is helpful when we need to know
some propositions of the equilibrium output, but cannot exactly solve the equilibrium.
Proposition 1.2 The reaction function of Firm i against the total output of all the
other ￿rms decreases monotonously.
This proposition provides us with a clear picture about the monotonicity of the equa-
tion (1.4), which indicates that the relationship between the outputs of the Firm i and the
total output of all the other ￿rms is always strategical substitution. Moreover, from the
monotonicity of the function, we know that only unique best response for Firm i can maxi-
mize its pro￿ts for a given total output of all other ￿rms. In Katz and Shapiro’s model, they
indicated that the ￿rms may have more than one best response for a given action of all the
other ￿rms after accounting for the network externalities. They explained this declaration
using the reaction, stating that it will be a curve rather than a straight line if the network
externality function is non-linear. However, from Proposition 1.1, we know that, in our
model, no matter what shapes of the network utility functions are, the situation indicated
by Katz and Shapiro is not likely to occur.
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Figure-1.1: Firm i’s reaction function
As can be seen, although
P
xj can be any number larger than 0, the Firm i’s best
response is bounded. From u00(xi) 6 0, we know u0(x) decreases with an increase in x. If
19u0(0) < 1, we have u0(xi) < 1 for any xi > 0. Thus, xi can be chosen from any positive
number without violation of Proposition 1.1. The Figure-1.1-A illustrates this situation. In
Figure-1.1-A, when the total output of the other ￿rms is larger than a certain number, Firm
i will always set its output at 0. When
P
xj chooses 0, Firm i will choose its output as the
market is a monopoly. If u0(0) > 1, xi cannot be 0 or any number very near to 0 because of
Proposition 1.1. However, a ! (! > 0) can always be found and u0(xi) < 1 for all xi > !.
We de￿ne the minimum ! is !￿. Firm i will always at least produce !￿ if it faces utility
functions with u0(0) > 1. The Figure-1.1-B illustrates this situation. When total output
chosen by all of the other ￿rms is greater than a certain number, Firm i will always set its
output as !￿. When the total output of all other ￿rms is 0, Firm i sets its output as the
market is a monopoly.
From the ￿gure we know that, for some products of which u0(xi) is very large when
xi is very small, every ￿rm can bene￿t from setting a positive output regardless of the
intensity of the competition in the market. No ￿rm can drive others out of the market by
simply increasing its output. However, for some products, of which the utility of network
is relatively small, the competition in the market may drive a ￿rm out of the market or force
it not to produce when other ￿rms set a large output level..
1.2.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Equilibrium
In a traditional Cournot competition, there only exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
in which all the ￿rms choose equal outputs. The reason behind this is that the reaction
function in the traditional Cournot model is a linear line and that two linear lines only have
one crossing point. After we add the network externalities into the Cournot model, we can
see from Figure-1.1 that the reaction function could be a curve and two curves may cross




Figure-1.2: Reaction function of Firm i and Firm j
Figure-1.2 illustrates that whether the asymmetric equilibrium exists mainly depends
upon the shape of the reaction function, while the shape of the function is determined by
the form of the network utility function.
Proposition 1.3 The necessary condition for the existence of an asymmetric
equilibrium is u0(0) > 1=2.
According to Corollary 1.1, if the effect of network externalities is strong and u0(x)
is greater than 1 for any x > 0, the equilibrium does not exist since the ￿rms will continue
to increase their output. If the network effect is medium: u0(0) > 1=2 and u0(xi) < 1, for
some xi, multiple equilibria may exist, which is illustrated in Figure-1.2-A. If the network
externalities are relatively small: u0(xi) < u0(0) < 1=2, the model only has a unique sym-
metric equilibrium. This is because the radian of reaction function is not large enough to
create an asymmetric equilibrium, which is illustrated in Figure-1.2-B. The characteristics
of asymmetric equilibrium are very dif￿cult to determine especially when we don’t know
the precise form of the network utility function. However, the symmetric equilibrium al-
ways exists according to the ￿xed point theorem and is relatively easy to calculate. The
following sections will mainly consider the propositions in a symmetric equilibrium.
211.3 Merger with Network Externalities
1.3.1 Firm’s Merger Incentive
We consider a market with n ￿rms, among which m + 1 ￿rms intend to merge (0 < m 6
n￿1). When m = 0, no merger occurs. When m = n￿1, all the ￿rms merge into one ￿rm
and the market becomes a monopoly. We de￿ne the percentage of the ￿rms who choose
to merge as ￿ ￿ m+1
n . From the previous discussion, we know multiple equilibria may
exist because of the distortion of the reaction functions by non-linear network externalities.
Thus, the output after merger is uncertain since the market could reach any one of the
equilibria. However, In this study, we focus on the the situation in which the network effect
is limited and the asymmetric equilibrium does not exist.
3 We assume that ￿rms know,
before and after a merger, they will always be located in a symmetric equilibrium.
Since all the ￿rms are symmetric, x1 = x2 = ::: = xn￿1 = xn. By combining this
condition with equation (1.4), we can obtain:
1 + u(xi) + xiu
0(xi) ￿ 2xi = (n ￿ 1)xi i 2 f1;:::;ng (1.5)
By solving equation (1.5), we can get the equilibrium output of ￿rms prior to the merger
and we use x￿ to denote the solution of equation (1.5).
Proposition 1.4 For any network utility function in our de￿nition, there exists and
only exists one symmetric equilibrium.
The intuition behind this proposition is very simple, especially when we refer to
Figure-1.1. According Figure-1.1, the left side of equation (1.5) is monotonically decreas-
ing and we can see the right side of equation (1.5) is a straight line which goes up from
origin. These two functions must cross, but cannot cross more than once in their de￿nition
3 The allocation of the asymmetric equilibrium is dif￿cult to determine when we don’t know the exact form
of the utility function. A more general discussion about the asymmetric equilibrium would therefore be a
good future work and extension of this thesis.
22area. This proposition illustrates that, for any given network utility function and the num-
ber of ￿rms, n, ￿rms can always set their output as x￿ to reach the symmetric equilibrium
and that this symmetric equilibrium is unique.
After the merger, only n ￿ m ￿rms remain in the market. From the assumption, we
know that they are still located in the symmetric equilibrium. We can use the same method
to solve the equilibrium after the merger. By equation (1.5), we can get:
1 + u(yi) + yiu
0(yi) ￿ 2yi = (n ￿ m ￿ 1)yi i 2 f1;:::;n ￿ mg (1.6)
We de￿ne the solution of equation (1.6) as y￿. y￿ is the symmetric equilibrium output of
the ￿rms after the merger. From Proposition 1.4 we know that y￿, which always exists, is
bigger than 0 and unique.
Proposition 1.5 For any given network utility function in our de￿nition, the
symmetric equilibrium output of the ￿rms prior to the merger are less than the symmetric
equilibrium output of the ￿rms after the merger.
Proposition 1.5 is equivalent to the conclusion that the solution of equation (1.6), y￿,
is always larger than the solution of equation (1.5), x￿. It is easy to ￿nd that the left side
of equation (1.5) and (1.6) have the same shape and the right side of the equations are both
straight lines. Because m > 0, the right side of equation (1.6) is always below the right
side of equation (1.5). Since the reaction function is monotonically decreasing, it always
crosses the line (n ￿ 1)xi earlier than (n ￿ m ￿ 1)yi. Thus, y￿ is always greater than
x￿. In a Cournot competition, ￿rms will increase their output to receive more pro￿ts if
the number of the competitors decreases. When the intensity of the competition is reduced
with a decrease in the number of ￿rms in the market, ￿rms have less burden to control
their output to keep the price. Although, in our model, network externalities distort the
price function in traditional Cournot model, this rule never changes and will hold for any
network utility function.
We denote the pro￿ts of ￿rms prior to the merger as ￿(n) and the pro￿ts of ￿rms after
the merger as ￿(n￿m). Salant (1983) has pointed out that one of the suf￿cient conditions
23for the ￿rms to join the merger is they can obtain extra pro￿ts from the merger action. This
suf￿cient condition can be shown in the following equation:
￿(n ￿ m) > (m + 1)￿(n) (1.7)
The left side of the equation is the equilibrium pro￿ts of the merged entity and the right
side is the total pro￿ts of the ￿rms who intented to merge prior to merger action taking
place. This equation suggests that the merger will occur only when the merged entity can
receive more pro￿ts than the total pro￿ts they earned as an individual prior to the merger.







Here, p(y￿) and p(x￿) are the equilibrium prices in the market before and after the merger.
From equation (1.2), (1.5) and (1.6), we can get:
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Since y￿ > x￿ and 1 ￿ u0(y￿) > 1 ￿ u0(x￿), we have p(y￿) > p(x￿).
Proposition 1.6 For any given network utility function in our de￿nition, the symmet-
ric equilibrium price in the market before the merger is always less than the equilibrium
price after the merger.
Adding network externalities into the demand function will not change the fact that
merger reduces the competition between ￿rms and ￿rms can set a higher equilibrium price
after merger.








24equation (1.5) and (1.6) can be rewriten as:
x
￿ =




1 + u(y￿) + y￿u0(y￿)
n ￿ n￿ + 2
(1.12)
By substituting (1.12) into (1.11), we can obtain:
p




(1 + u(y￿) + y￿u0(y￿))
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1 ￿ u0(y￿)






(1 + u(y￿) + y￿u0(y￿))
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1 ￿ u0(y￿)





￿(n ￿ n￿ + 2)
Here, ￿ changes with the change of the intensity of network effect. If there is no network







equation (1.14) is a suf￿cient condition for ￿rms to merge without network externalities.













From the de￿nition of ￿, we know that ￿ 2 ( 1
n;1]. When ￿ = 1, t(￿) = 2. When
￿ = 1
n, t(￿) = n+1 p
n . From Figure-1.3, we can see that the equation (1.14) will only hold
when ￿ 2 (￿1;1]. From the de￿nition: n > 2, we can obtain ￿1 > 0:8. This result
25coincides with Salant’s model (1983). For a given n, m and u(:), we can solve equation
(1.5) and (1.6) to ￿nd x￿ and y￿ and substitute them into ￿ to create a value which reveals
the intensity of the effect of network externalities. If ￿ > 1, the line t(￿) = ￿n+1 p
n moves
upward. Then, we can conclude ￿2 > ￿1 from the illustration of Figure-1.3. Since equation
(1.13) holds for any ￿ 2 (￿2;1], an ￿, which is larger than 1, relaxes the condition for
mergers to be pro￿table.
Proposition 1.7 For any network utility function in our de￿nition, the condition
for the mergers to be pro￿table is always relaxed when we consider the effect of network
externalities.
This proposition illustrates that, for any n, m and u(:), ￿ is always larger than 1.
This means the ￿rms who produce network goods are always more likely to merge than
the ￿rms who produce goods without network externalities. The network externalities not
only bene￿ts the consumers but also the ￿rms. This can be seen from the fact that, after
the merger, the consumers value the same products more and the ￿rms can charge a higher
price if network externalities present. If the ￿rms produce network products, they can ob-
tain two aspects of bene￿ts from the merger action. On one hand, the merger reduces the
competition between the ￿rms and push up the price in the market. On the other hand,
the merger increases every ￿rm’s individual output, hence increasing the goods’ network
externalities and making them more attractive to the consumers. Because ￿rms who pro-
duce network products bene￿t more from the merger, the requirement for the merger to be
privately desirable is reduced.
In Salant’s model, if we rule out the monopoly case, we need at least ￿ve ￿rms in
the market and over 80 percent of the ￿rms to join the merger to enable the merger to be
privatly pro￿table. In our model, this condition can be greatly relaxed. Salant et al (1983)
indicates that social planner should be cautious to any merger proposal since any privately
desirable merger will greatly increase the concentration of the industry. However, in our
model, if the ￿rms produce network products, the merger may occur with a relatively small
26change in the market structure. Moreover, the consumers have as much potential to bene￿t
from the merger behaviour as the ￿rms. This will be discussed in the next section.
1.3.1 Social Welfare
In a general de￿nition, social welfare can be measured as the sum of the total pro￿ts of the
￿rms and the total surplus of the consumers. The surplus of a consumer, who is type r, is
r + u(xi) ￿ pi. According to the equation (1.2), pi = 1 + u(xi) ￿ z, so we can rewrite the
surplus as r +z ￿1. As we know from the previous discussion, only the consumers whose









Equation (1.15) indicates that the consumer’s total welfare is the function of ￿rms’ total
output. And the ￿rms’ total output is determined by the number of the consumers who
entered the market. If the total output increases or more consumers join the market, the
consumer’s welfare will increase. If the total output decreases or less consumers are willing
to pay for the product, the consumer’s welfare will decrease. In the equilibrium, we denote
the total surplus of the consumers before the merger as S(n) and the total surplus of the






(1 ￿ x￿ + u(x￿) + x￿u0(x￿))2
2
(1.16)




(1 ￿ y￿ + u(y￿) + y￿u0(y￿))2
2
(1.17)
If we know the form of the utility function, we can solve the function (1.5) and (1.6) to
obtain x￿ and y￿. And then, we may substitute them into the above equations and compare
S(n) with S(n ￿ m) to get the effect of the merger to social welfare. If we don’t know the
details of the utility function, we can also obtain the effect of the merger to social welfare
when the utility function satis￿es some speci￿c conditions.
27Proposition 1.8 If ￿1+2u0(x)+xu00(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], the total output of
the￿rmsandtheconsumer’swelfareincreaseafterthemerger. If ￿1+2u0(x)+xu00(x) < 0
for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], the total output of the ￿rms and the consumer’s welfare decreases after
the merger.
If ￿1+2u0(x)+xu00(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], we have a relatively large u0(x) and
small u00(x) in the interval [x￿;y￿]. According to the economic interpretation of the ￿rst and
second derivatives of the network utility function, the ￿rst part of this proposition illustrates
that, no matter how small the network externality, the merger will always increase total
output and consumer’s welfare as long as the network externality increases very quickly
and this increasing trend is persistent. The second part of the proposition illustrates that the
merger will decrease consumer’s welfare if the network utility function is relatively ￿at and
the trend of increasing drops very quickly with the increase of x, regardless of the absolute
value of the network externalities.
Corollary 1.3 If u0(x￿) < 1
2, the consumer’s welfare decreases after the merger.
Corollary 1.4 If u0(0) < 1
2, the consumer’s welfare decrease after the merger.
Corollary 1.3 tells us that if we want to increase the consumer’s welfare, we must
have a relatively small equilibrium output prior to the merger to make u0(x￿) > 1
2. Since
we know that the equilibrium output decreases with the increase in the number of the ￿rms
in the market, this corollary may also indicate that the smaller the number of the ￿rms in
the industry, the less likely that the merger increases consumer’s welfare and total output.
Corollary 1.4 is a more strict, but simple condition for us to identify which network utility
function will decrease the total output and consumer’s welfare.
28From (1.3), (1.5), (1.6), (1.9) and (1.10), we can obtain the total pro￿ts of ￿rms in
the equilibrium before and after the merger as:
￿￿ex-ante = nx
￿p(x









￿￿ex-post = (n ￿ m)y
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From Proposition 1.6, we know that p(y￿) > p(x￿), so the total pro￿ts of the ￿rms
increase after merger if (n￿m)y￿ > nx￿. (n￿m)y￿ > nx￿ indicates that the total output
increases after the merger or the ￿rst part of the Proposition 1.8 holds.
It is also easy to know that the ￿rms who stand outside merger will bene￿t more
from the merger action than the ￿rms who join the merger. Thus, we can also get the
conclusion that if a merger is privately pro￿table (make equation (1.13) hold), this merger
must increase the total pro￿ts of all the ￿rms.
More generally, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.9 For any network utility function in our de￿nition, the total pro￿ts
of the ￿rms always increase after the merger.
This proposition indicates that, no matter how many ￿rms join the merger or what
the form of the network utility function is, the total pro￿ts of the ￿rms always increase with
the decrease of the number of the ￿rms in the market. A merger can only exist (privately
pro￿table) when enough ￿rms to join the merger. However, in a social planner’s position,
any mergers will de￿nitely be pro￿table for ￿rms as a whole. This proposition is true in
both the traditional Cournot competition and the competition with network externalities.
Now we stand at the position of social planner to calculate the effect of the merger
to total social welfare. We denote the total social welfare prior to the merger as W(n) and
the total social welfare after the merger as W(n ￿ m). Combining equation (1.16), (1.17),
(1.18) and (1.19), we can obtain that:
W(n) = S(n) + ￿￿ex-ante =
(1 + u(x￿))2 ￿ (x￿(1 ￿ u0(x￿)))2
2
(1.20)
29W(n ￿ m) = S(n ￿ m) + ￿￿ex-post =
(1 + u(y￿))2 ￿ (y￿(1 ￿ u0(y￿)))2
2
(1.21)
When we have enough information about the market, for example we know m, n and the
form of the network utility function, the standard way for the social planner to determine
whether the merger increases the total social welfare or not is: ￿rstly solving the equation
(1.5) and (1.6) to obtain x￿ and y￿, then substituting them into (1.20) and (1.21) and ￿nally
comparing W(n) with W(n￿m). If we cannot obtain the full information about the market
and products, we can still identify the merger which increase the social welfare with the
following proposition:
Proposition 1.10 If W 0(x) > 0 for any x in our de￿nition area, the total social
welfare increases after the merger. If W 0(x) < 0 for any x in our de￿nition area, the total
social welfare decreases after the merger.
Here, W(x) is a continuous and differentiable function de￿ned as:
W(x) =
(1 + u(x))2 ￿ (x(1 ￿ u0(x)))2
2
(1.22)
and we can get:
W
0(x) = (1 + u(x))u




Since y￿ > x￿, W(n ￿ m) is larger than W(n) when W 0(x) > 0 and is less than
W(n) when W 0(x) < 0. This indicates that, if the social planner ￿nds the utility function
satis￿es W 0(x) > 0 for any x, they should be glad to boost the merger activities since
any merger can increase the social welfare. One of the typical cases for this situation is
u(x) = bx with b > 1
2.
If we do not consider the synergies, the social welfare will never increase after the
merger in a world without network externalties. This can get proved by deleting u(:) from
the equation (1.23). If there is no network effect, W 0(x) = ￿x, which is negative for any
x in de￿nition area.
30Corollary 1.5 If ￿1 + 2u0(x) + xu00(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], the total social
welfare increases after the merger.
Corollary 1.6 If ￿1+2u0(x)+xu00(x) > 1￿ 1
1￿u0(x) for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], the total
social welfare increases after the merger.
The form and meaning of equation (1.23) is dif￿cult to understand. However, Corol-
lary 1.5 gives us a stricter but more explainable condition. From Proposition 1.9, we know
that the total pro￿ts of the ￿rms increase after the merger. Because, in our de￿nition, so-
cial welfare equals to the sum of the total pro￿ts of the ￿rms and the consumer’s total
surplus, social welfare will de￿nitely increases after the merger if the merger increases the
consumer’s welfare. This suggests that the social planner should pay attention to the con-
sumer’s welfare ￿rst. If they can make sure the merger bene￿ts the consumers, they can
make the conclusion that the merger is a "good" merger without further investigation.
Another interesting question is whether there exists any merger which decreases the
consumer’s welfare, but increase the total social welfare? Corollary 1.6 provides us a more
relaxed condition than Corollary 1.5. Since we know that 1 > 1 ￿ u0(x) > 0 for any
x 2 [x￿;y￿], 1￿ 1
1￿u0(x) isalwaysanegativenumber. Thus, Corollary1.6indicatesthatthere
may exist some network utility function which makes the consumer’s welfare decrease, but
social welfare increase after the merger.
311.4 Merger with Linear Network Utility Function
1.4.1 The Existence of a "Good" Merger
Although we developed some general rules for the social planner to determine whether the
merger will increase social welfare or not in the previous sections, these propositions are
all suf￿cient conditions. If we want to obtain the suf￿cient and necessary conditions, we
need to solve equation (1.5) and (1.6) and get the absolute value of x￿ and y￿, which will
enable us to give a precise comparison about the social welfare before and after the merger.
To make x￿ and y￿ solvable, we introduce a linear network utility function u(x) = bx
instead of the general utility function. Another advantage of the linear utility function is
it is very easy for us to measure the intensity of the network externality. For a general
form of the network utility function, it is hard to compare the intensity of the network
effect between different products, since the relationship may change with the change of
the network size. If we use a linear utility function, the second derivative of the function
is a constant number b, which can always be seen as the indicator of the intensity of the
network effect and will not change with the size of the network. In the following context,
we may use b to indicate a more precise relationship between the intensity of the network
effect with the merger behaviour of the ￿rms.
We de￿ne u(x) = bx, 0 < b < 1. Since u0(x) = b < 1 for any x, our assumption
does not violate Proposition 1.1. By substituting the linear utility function into equation
(1.3) and (1.4), we obtain:
￿i = pixi = xi(1 + bxi ￿ z) i 2 f1;:::;ng
1 + 2bxi ￿ 2xi =
X
i6=j
xj i 2 f1;:::;ng (1.24)
Since we only consider the symmetric equilibrium, we have x1 = x2 = ::: = xn￿1 =
xn. By solving equation (1.24), we can obtain the unique symmetric equilibrium output of
the ￿rms as:
32x
￿ = xi =
1
n + 1 ￿ 2b




n + 1 ￿ 2b
Thus, each ￿rm’s pro￿t is:
￿(n) = xp =
1 ￿ b
(n + 1 ￿ 2b)2
After the merger, the total number of the ￿rms in the market is n ￿ m. Since the
procedure to solve the equilibrium after the merger is identical to the procedure to solve the
equilibrium prior to the merger, we only need to change n with n ￿ m to get y￿, p(x￿) and
￿(n￿m). If we substitute these results into equation (1.7), we can obtain the condition for
the merger to be privately pro￿table as:
￿(n ￿ m) ￿ (m + 1)￿(n) = ￿
m(1 ￿ b)(n￿ ￿ A)(n￿ ￿ B)
(n ￿ m + 1 ￿ 2b)2(n + 1 ￿ 2b)2 > 0 (1.25)
Here we use A and B to denote the following equations:
A =
2n + 3 ￿ 4b ￿
p
4n + 5 ￿ 8b
2
;B =
2n + 3 ￿ 4b +
p
4n + 5 ￿ 8b
2
Proposition 1.11 The suf￿cient and necessary condition for the merger to be
privately pro￿table is the proportion of the ￿rms joining the merger is larger than A
n.
This proposition indicates that if the merger is privately pro￿table, the proportion of
the ￿rms joining the merger must be large enough. If we go back to Figure-1.3, we will
￿nd that A






2n , which coincides with the result in Salant et al. (1983) ’s paper. We can
also tell that @A=@b < 0 for any n > 2; which suggests A goes smaller with an increase
of b. Since b is the intensity of network effect and ￿2 = A
n, we may conclude that the
condition for the merger to be privately desirable will be relaxed additionally if these is a
33stronger network effect. Hence, ￿rms may be willing to merge with just a little increase of
the industry concentration in a market with suf￿cient strong network effect.
By substituting x￿, y￿ and u(x) = bx into equation (1.20) and (1.21), we can get:
W(n ￿ m) ￿ W(n) =
(4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1)(n￿ ￿ C)
2(n ￿ n￿ + 2 ￿ 2b)2(n + 1 ￿ 2b)2 > 0
Here, for ease of notation, we use C to denote the the following equation:
C =
2n ￿ 14b ￿ 10bn + 20b2 ￿ 8b3 ￿ 2bn2 + 8b2n + 3
4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1
Proposition 1.12 The suf￿cient and necessary condition for the existence of a
merger, which increases social welfare, is 4b2￿2bn￿4b+1 < 0 and the proportion of the
￿rms joining the merger is less than C
n.
This proposition provides an easy way for the social planner to judge whether the
potential merger increases social welfare if the network utility function is linear. First, the
social planner need to know how strong the network effect (the value of b) is and how
concentrated the industry is (the value of n). If the network effect is very weak, the merger,
which increases social welfare, can only exsits in a relatively less concentrated market. If
the industry is highly concentrated, a relatively large network effect is a must to ensure
these exsits a socially desirable merger. If n and b make 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 > 0, social
planner should block all the merger application. It is because, in this market condition, any
merger will de￿nitely decrease social welfare, no matter how many ￿rms join the merger.
If 4b2￿2bn￿4b+1 < 0, only the merger with proportion ￿ less than C
n is a "good" merger.
The social planner needs to compare the proportion of the ￿rms intending to merge with C
n
to determine whether the merger should be approved.
Proposition 1.13 There exists a merger which is privately pro￿table and socially
desirable if and only if n >
(2b￿1)2(2b+1)
4b2 .
From Proposition 1.11, we know that if a merger is privately pro￿table, the propor-
tion of the ￿rms joining the merger should be greater than A
n. The ￿rms always want the
34market goes to more concentrated, since they may charge higher price to the consumers.
Proposition 1.12 tells us that if the social planner wants the merger to increases social wel-
fare, the proportion of the ￿rms joining the merger should be limited to below a speci￿c
number. This is because if the proportion of the ￿rms joining the merger is larger than C
n,
all the bene￿t from the merger (additional network externalities) will offset by the harm
from reduction of the competition in the market. Thus, a socially desirable merger must
be a merger with gently increasing of market concentration. Proposition 1.13 provides us
with a suf￿cient and necessary condition to determine whether there exists an intersec-
tion between Proposition 1.11 and Proposition 1.12. Only the merger which is located in
this intersection is a "good" merger which can be realized. To obtain more intuition into
Proposition 1.13, we can draw the condition in Proposition 1.13 in the following ￿gure:
















The inequality n >
(2b￿1)2(2b+1)
4b2 is illustrated in Figure-1.4, where we can see: when
b is relatively small, a large n is needed to keep the inequation existing and when b is rela-
tively large, the requirement for n to make the inequality hold is not very strict. Proposition
1.13 indicates that the existence of the intersection between Proposition 1.11 and Propo-
sition 1.12 depends upon the concentration of the industry and the characteristics of the
products. In an over-concentrated industry with a relatively weak network effect, there will
35be less possibility to have a "good" merger. But if the number of the ￿rms in the indus-
try is relatively large and the network effect of the products is strong, there will be a better
chance of having a privately pro￿table and socially optimal merger, or a "good" merger.
Corollary 1.7 If b > 0:23, any potential merger has the possibility to bene￿t both
the ￿rms and society if a suitable proportion of the ￿rms join the merger.
This Corollary is also illustrated in Figure-1.4. The horizontal line in Figure-1.4 is
n = 2. Since we know that n > 2, from the ￿gure, we can conclude that, when b is larger
than a certain number, any n in our de￿nition will make n >
(2b￿1)2(2b+1)
4b2 . This provides
us a more straight condition: when b is larger than 0:23, there will always exist a "good
merger". The only thing that social planner needs to do to realize this "good" merger is to
control the number of the ￿rms joining the merger.
1.4.1 Chooseing a Suitable Number of Firms to Join the Merger
According to the de￿nition, m+1 denotes the number of ￿rms who join the merger. From
the previous discussions, we know that, if social planner knows that a "good" merger exists
in the industry, the next work is to control the proportion, or the number, of the ￿rms joining
the merger to make sure that the "good" merger is realized.
Proposition 1.14 With the condition that n >
(2b￿1)2(2b+1)





2 is a suitable m which makes the merger both privately prof-






4b2￿2bn￿4b+1 is a suitable m which can make the merger both privately pro￿table
and socially optimal.
Corollary 1.8 If b > 0:26, m is only bounded by privately pro￿table restriction.




2 is a suitable m which can make the merger
both privately pro￿table and socially optimal.






4b2￿2bn￿4b+1 is a suitable m which can make the merger
both privately pro￿table and socially optimal.
If the social planner knows how concentrated the industry is and the intensity of
network effect of the products, Proposition 1.14 provides us a criterion to evaluate whether
the potential merger is good merger or not. Since it is dif￿cult to understand the intuition
behind the relationship between C and n, we can only get very little information from this
proposition. However, Corollary 1.8 and 1.9 are more intuitionistic. They illustrate that
when the network externalities are very large (b > 0:26), the social planner doesn’t need to
set any restrictions to the merger, since all of the mergers are socially optimal. Therefore,
social planner should encourage the ￿rms to merge and boost a dominator for the industry.
However, when the network externalities are relatively small (b < 0:19), the number of
￿rms who join the merger must be chosen carefully. If m is too large, which means too
many ￿rms join the merger, the social welfare will be harmed; if m is very small, the
merger is not attractive to the ￿rms anymore.
371.5 Conclusions and Future Work
The network effect distorts the reaction function of the ￿rms in Cournot competition, but
this distortion does not change some of the basic characteristics of the reaction function,
such as monotonicity. The distortion provides a possibility of the existence of multiple
equilibria, which requires a relatively strong network effect. However, extremely large
network effect results in a situation in which no equilibrium exists. This is because ￿rms
will never stop increasing their outputs if the bene￿t from network effect can always offset
the price losses from producing an additional product. In this study, we limit our discussion
to an industry with a relatively week network effect, so the multiple equilibria are ruled out.
Althoughtheconclusionsinthischapterareonlyvalidforasectionofallthenetworkutility
functions, it still provides us with some information of how the network effect changes the
￿rm’s behaviour in the competition and merger choice and gives us some hints for the study
of a more general result.
If we only consider the symmetric equilibrium, the network effect will make ￿rms
more zealous in merger activities, compared with the conclusion of Salant’s model. Conse-
quently, a merger with only a relatively small proportion of all the ￿rms getting involved,
which is not possible in Salant’s model, may occur in our model. Merger between the
￿rms, who produce network products, can bring some level of bene￿t to consumers through
network externalities, so there exists a merger which increases social welfare without the
consideration of supply-side economics of scale.
A linear network utility function will greatly reduce the calculations and bring some
convenience to the denoting of the intensity of the network effect. With the help of the
linear network utility function, we ￿nd that, in some mergers, the pro￿t of the ￿rms and
the social welfare are not always contradictive. If the network externality is very strong or
the market is not highly concentrated yet, it is possible to exist a "good" merger which is
both privately pro￿table and socially optimal. Moreover, if the network externality is large
enough, the social planner doesn’t need to set any restrictions to the merger behaviour since
all the mergers which are privately pro￿table will be socially optimal as well. However, if
38the network externality is relatively weak, the social planner should set some restrictions to
the number of the ￿rms joining the merger in order to make the "good" merger be realized.
We recommend that a more general discussion about the situation in which the multiple
equilibria exist be conducted in the future.
391.6 Appendix
A1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Assume xi maximize the pro￿t of ￿rm i for a given total output of all other ￿rms. From the




0(xi) ￿ 1 (xi > 0)
If u0(xi) > 1, we have @pi=@xi > 0. Assume x0
i is slightly larger than xi, then we have
p0




xj > pi. Thus, ￿0
i = p0
ix0
i > pixi = ￿i and xi cannot maximize
the pro￿t of ￿rm i, which contradicts with our assumption. Hence, we may conclude that
if xi maximize the pro￿t of ￿rm i for a given total output of all other ￿rms, there must have
u0(xi) < 1.
A1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2





xj = 1 + u(xi) + xiu





00(xi) ￿ 2 = 2(u
0(xi) ￿ 1) + xiu
00(xi) (1.27)
Here xi is always the best response for a given
P
xj. From Proposition 1.1, we have
u0(xi) ￿ 1 < 0. By the de￿nition, we have u00(xi) < 0 and xi > 0, so it is easy to know
g0(xi) < 0. Hence, we may conclude that the reaction function g(x) is monotonically
decreasing.
A1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Before we begin the proof, we need to prove the following lemma ￿rst.
40Lemma 1.1 For any two functions, if the slope of one of the functions is always
larger than other’s, these two functions have no more than one crossing point.
Proof. Assume functions m(x) and n(x) have two crossing point x1, x2 (x1 6= x2)
and q(x) = m(x) ￿ n(x). Since m(x1) = n(x1) and m(x2) = n(x2), q(x1) = 0 and
q(x2) = 0. q0(x) = m0(x) ￿ n0(x). If m0(x) is always bigger than n0(x), q0(x) > 0 for
any given x. This means q(x) is monotonic increasing and there cannot exist two different
value: x1 and x2 which let q(x1) and q(x2) equal to zero at the same time. So the function
m(x) and n(x) cannot have more than one crossing point.
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
From the equation (1.27)
g
0(xi) = 2(u
0(xi) ￿ 1) + xiu
00(xi)
From the de￿nition xi > 0 and u00(x) < 0, if u0(0) < 1=2, u0(xi) 6 u0(0) < 0:5.
Thus, we have g0(xi) < 2(0:5 ￿ 1) + 0 = ￿1. Firm i’s competitor’s reaction is just the
inverse of ￿rm i’s reaction function against to 45 degree line. If the slope of ￿rm i’s reaction
function is less than ￿1 for any xi, his competitor’s reaction function will always bigger
than ￿1. From Lemma 1.1, we know that ￿rm i and his competitor’s reaction function
will have no more than one crossing point. This means there does not exist more than one
equilibrium. Since the symmetric equilibrium is always exist according to the ￿xed point
theorem. If there exist asymmetric equilibrium, we must have u0(0) > 1=2.
A1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
What we need to do is to prove that equation (1.5) only has a unique solution. Assume
there exist two solution, x1 and x2 for equation (1.5) and x1 > x2 > 0. we have:
g(x1) = 1 + u(x1) + x1u
0(x1) ￿ 2x1 = (n ￿ 1)x1 (1.28)
g(x2) = 1 + u(x2) + x2u
0(x2) ￿ 2x2 = (n ￿ 1)x2 (1.29)
41From the proof of Proposition 1.2, we know that g(x) is a monotonically decreasing func-
tion, so g(x1) < g(x2). Since n > 2, (n￿1)x1 > (n￿1)x2. This makes (1.28) contradict
with (1.29). Thus, we may conclude that there is no more than one solution for equation
(1.5). We can also rewrite equation (1.5) as:
1 + u(xi) + xiu
0(xi) ￿ nxi = xi i 2 f1;:::;ng (1.30)
Since the left part of (1.30) is continuous and differentiable function, equation (1.5) have
more than one solution according to the ￿xed point theorem. Thus equation (1.5) have and
only have one solution and the market exist and only exist one symmetric equilibrium.
A1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proving Proposition 1.5 equals to prove the solution of equation (1.6), y￿, is bigger than the
solution of equation (1.5), x￿. We may de￿ne a function:
h(x) = 1 + u(x) + xu
0(x) ￿ (n + 1)x
By the de￿nition of the network utility function, we get h(0) = 1 + u(0) + 0u0(0) ￿ (n +
1)0 = 1. As we know that y￿ is the solution of equation (1.6), we have
h(y




￿) ￿ (n + 1)y
￿ = ￿my
￿ < 0
Since h(x) is a continuous function, h(0) > 0 and h(y￿) < 0, there must exist a ￿ 2 (0;y￿)
which makes h(￿) = 0.
h(￿) = 0 () 1 + u(￿) + ￿u
0(￿) ￿ (n + 1)￿ = 0 (1.31)
Obviously, equation (1.31) has a same form as equation (1.5), From Proposition 1.4, we
know that equation (1.31) has and only has unique solution ￿ = x￿. Since ￿ 2 (0;y￿), we
must have x￿ 2 (0;y￿) or we can say x￿ < y￿.
A1.6 Proof of Proposition 1.7
We need to prove the following lemma ￿rst:
42Lemma 1.2 For any x 2 [x￿;y￿] and utility function in our de￿nition, 1 + u(x) +
xu0(x) ￿ 2x > 0.
Proof. From (1.26) and (1.27), we know that g(x) = 1 + u(x) + xu0(x) ￿ 2x and
g0(x) = 2(u0(x)￿1)+xu00(x). From Corollary 1.2, we know u0(x￿) < 1. Since u00(x) 6 0,
for any x > x￿, we have u0(x) < 1, which indicates for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], u0(x) < 1. So
g0(x) < 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿]. The minimum of g(x) is g(y￿) if x is chosen from [x￿;y￿].
Since y￿ is the solution of equation (1.6), we have:
g(y





￿ = (n ￿ m ￿ 1)y
￿ > 0
g(y￿) = 0 if and only if m = n ￿ 1 which means the merger creates monopoly in the
market. So for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], g(x) is non-negative.
Proof of Proposition 1.7:
We may de￿ne a function:
k(x) = (1 + u(x) + xu
0(x))
p
1 ￿ u0(x) x 2 [x
￿;y
￿]
As we know from Proof of the Lemma 1.2, u0(x) < 1 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿],
p
1 ￿ u0(x)
always has a real value for x 2 [x￿;y￿]. From the de￿nition of the network utility function
(u(x) > 0, x > 0 and u0(x) > 0), we know k(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿] and k(x) is a
continuous and differentiable function. The ￿rst derivative of function k(x) is:
k
0(x) =




From Lemma 1.2, we know that g(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿] and we also know that
u(x) > 0, x > 0, 1 ￿ u0(x) > 0 and u00(x) < 0. So it is easy to see that k0(x) > 0 for any








(1 + u(y￿) + y￿u0(y￿))
p
1 ￿ u0(y￿)
(1 + u(x￿) + x￿u0(x￿))
p
1 ￿ u0(x￿)
= ￿ > 1
for any network utility function in our de￿nition and any x 2 [x￿;y￿].
43A1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.8
Wecande￿nethetotaloutputintheequilibriumasacontinuousanddifferentiablefunction:
l(x) = 1 ￿ x + u(x) + xu
0(x) =)
l
0(x) = ￿1 + 2u
0(x) + xu
00(x)
If ￿1+2u0(x)+xu00(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], we have l0(x) > 0 and l(y￿) > l(x￿). So
we can get:
l(y




A1.8 Proof of Corollary 1.3 and 1.4









we can indicate that ￿1 + 2u0(x) + xu00(x) < 0 if u0(x) < 1
2. We also know that u0(x) 6
u0(x￿) < u0(0) for any x 2 [x￿;y￿]. So if we have u0(x￿) < 1
2 or u0(0) < 1
2, we may
conclude that u0(x) < 1
2 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿]. According to Proposition 1.8, these two
conditions are also the suf￿cient condition for merger to decrease the consumer’s welfare
and total output.
A1.9 Proof of Proposition 1.9
We de￿ne a continuous and differentiable function:




0(x) = (g(x) + xu
0(x))(1 ￿ u
0(x) ￿ xu
00(x)) + (1 ￿ u
0(x))xu
0(x)
From Lemma 1.2, Corollary 1.2 and the de￿nition of the network utility function, we know
that g(x) > 0, 1 ￿ u0(x) > 0, u00(x) < 0 and x > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿]. So v0(x) > 0 for
any x 2 [x￿;y￿]. We can then make the conclusion that:
v(x
￿) = ￿￿ex-ante < v(y
￿) = ￿￿ex-post
44for any network utility function and equilibrium output.
A1.10 Proof of Corollary 1.6
The condition W 0(x) > 0 can be rewrite as:
g(x)u
0(x) + xf1 ￿ [1 ￿ u
0(x)][2 ￿ 2u
0(x) ￿ xu
00(x)]g > 0 (1.32)
From Lemma 1.2, we know that g(x) > 0 for any x 2 [x￿;y￿]. So if we want the equation
(1.32) holds for any x 2 [x￿;y￿], we only need:




() ￿1 + 2u
0(x) + xu
00(x) > 1 ￿
1
1 ￿ u0(x)
holds for any x 2 [x￿;y￿].
A1.11 Proof of Proposition 1.11
The proof of this proposition is equivalent to prove that the suf￿cient and necessary con-
dition for ￿(n ￿ m) ￿ (m + 1)￿(n) to be larger than 0 is n￿ ￿ A > 0. Since we know
from the de￿nition that m > 0, 1 ￿ b > 0, if we can prove that n￿ ￿ B is negative, we can
then get the conclusion that ￿(n ￿ m) ￿ (m + 1)￿(n) is a positive number if and only if
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4n + 5 ￿ 8b
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= 1 +
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p
4n + 5 ￿ 8b
2n
> 1 +
3 ￿ 4 +
p
8 + 5 ￿ 8
4
> 1












4n + 5 ￿ 1)2
4n
As we know that n > 2, we can construct the following inequation:
450 > 6 ￿ 2
p
13 > 6 ￿ 2
p
4n + 5
() 4n + 5 ￿ 2
p
4n + 5 + 1 < 4n ()
(
p
4n + 5 ￿ 1)2
4n
< 1
This shows that A
n < 1 for any 0 < b < 1 and n > 2. Thus, we can make sure there always
exists a ￿ 2 ( 1
n;1) which let n￿ ￿ A > 0.
A1.12 Proof of Proposition 1.12
If 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 > 0, we can solve this inequality and obtain:
b <
n + 2 ￿
p
(n + 2)2 ￿ 4
4
or b >
n + 2 +
p










4 , we can
get b < 0:134 since n > 2. By rewriting 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 > 0, we can obtain:
2bn < 4b
2 ￿ 4b + 1 = (2b ￿ 1)
2 < 1
=) 8b
3 + 6nb + 14b < 5 < n + 3 + (20 + 4n)b
2
=) ￿8b
3 + (20 + 4n)b
2 + (￿6n ￿ 14)b + n + 3 > 0






2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1) (1.33)
Since we know 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 > 0, from (1.33), we can get:
2n ￿ 14b ￿ 10bn + 20b2 ￿ 8b3 ￿ 2bn2 + 8b2n + 3
4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1
> n =) C > n
Since 4b2 ￿2bn￿4b+1 > 0, the condition to make W(n￿m)￿W(n) > 0 is n￿￿C >
0 () ￿ > C
n > 1. But by the de￿nition, we know ￿ 6 1, so we can conclude that there
does not exist a merger which can increase the social welfare if 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 > 0.
If 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 = 0, we can obtain:






2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1) + (n + 3)(4b
2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1) + n = n > 0
46So W(n ￿ m) ￿ W(n) < 0. There does not exist a merger which can increase the social
welfare either.
If 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 < 0, the suf￿cient and necessary condition for a merge to
increase social welfare can be written as: ￿ < C
n.
A1.13 Proof of Proposition 1.13
From Proposition 1.11, we know that if we want the merger to be privately pro￿table, we
need ￿ > A
n. From Proposition 1.12, we know that if we want the merger to be social
desirable, we need 4b2￿2bn￿4b+1 < 0 and ￿ < C
n. By Combining these two conditions
together, we can obtain the suf￿cient and necessary condition that there exists a merge
which can bene￿t not only the ￿rms but also the whole society is: (i) 4b2￿2bn￿4b+1 < 0
, (ii) A < C. If an industry system can satisfy these two condition, there must exist an ￿,
which is between A
n and C
n, can satisfy Proposition 1.11 and 1.12 at the same time. From
(i), we can get: n >
(2b￿1)2
2b . From (ii), we can get:
2n + 3 ￿ 4b ￿
p
4n + 5 ￿ 8b
2
<
2n ￿ 14b ￿ 10bn + 20b2 ￿ 8b3 ￿ 2bn2 + 8b2n + 3
4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1
(1.34)
Since we have condition (i), (1.34) can be rewriten as:
p
4n ￿ 8b + 5 >
2n
￿(4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1)
￿ 3 (1.35)
If 2n
￿(4b2￿2bn￿4b+1) ￿ 3 6 0, we have A < C.
if 2n
￿(4b2￿2bn￿4b+1) ￿ 3 > 0, (1.35) can be written as:
4n ￿ 8b + 5 > (
2n




8b3 ￿ 4b2 ￿ 2b + 1
4b2 =








2b , the suf￿cient and necessary condition of (i) + (ii)
can be simpli￿ed as: n >
(2b￿1)2(2b+1)
4b2 .
47A1.14 Proof of Proposition 1.14
If C > n, the restriction A
n < ￿ < C
n can be rewritten as A
n < ￿ 6 1. This means m isn’t
bounded by the social welfare restriction.
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6 1 , A ￿ 1 < m 6 n ￿ 1
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2n + 1 ￿ 4b ￿
p
4n + 5 ￿ 8b
2
< m 6 n ￿ 1
















, A ￿ 1 < m < C ￿ 1
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(n + 1 ￿ 2b)(4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 6b + 2)
4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1
A1.15 Proof of Corollary 1.8 and 1.9:
C ￿ n =
(4b2 ￿ 6b + 1)n ￿ (2b ￿ 1)2(2b ￿ 3)
4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1
:
We know 4b2 ￿ 2bn ￿ 4b + 1 < 0, (2b ￿ 1)2(2b ￿ 3) < 0 and n > 0. Thus,





If 4b2 ￿ 6b + 1 < 0; we can conclude that, when n <
(2b￿1)2(2b￿3)
(2b￿1)2￿2b ;C ￿ n < 0 and
when n >
(2b￿1)2(2b￿3)
(2b￿1)2￿2b , C > n. We may draw the ￿gure of
(2b￿1)2(2b￿3)
(2b￿1)2￿2b as:













From Figure-1.5, we can see
(2b￿1)2(2b￿3)
(2b￿1)2￿2b < 2, when b > 0:26. So If b > 0:26,
C > n. We also know, if b < 0:19, C < n. However, if 0:19 < b < 0:26, the analysis
will be a little more complex. In this situation: if n <
(2b￿1)2(2b￿3)
(2b￿1)2￿2b , we have C < n. which
means m is bounded by both side. If n >
(2b￿1)2(2b￿3)
(2b￿1)2￿2b , we have C > n, which means m
isn’t bounded by the social welfare restriction.
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51Chapter 2
Merger through Acquisition with Inheritable
Indirect Network Externalities
Abstract
We investigate ￿rms’ acquisition behaviours if they may inherit indirect network exter-
nalities from the ￿rms they acquired. For a given symmetric initial market structure, we
provide the suf￿cient and necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which
some ￿rms are acquired by the others and reveal that these conditions are relaxed when the
indirect network is inheritable. For an asymmetric previous market structure, we ￿nd that
larger ￿rms acquiring smaller ￿rms occurs more easily than smaller ￿rms acquiring larger
ones. Inheritable indirect network externalities can provide an incentive for the ￿rms to
merge and also help the merged entities maintain their advantage position.
522.1 Introduction
In network economy, consumers may bene￿t from an increase in the number of consumers
who use the same or compatible products. This network externality, which signi￿cantly
affects the behaviours of both consumers and ￿rms, can be explained by two different
origins. The ￿rst is a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers on the quality of
products. A good example of the direct network effect is the mobile phone network ￿￿ It
is easy to understand that a mobile phone network with more users will be more valuable to
its consumers if different networks as a whole are incompatible, or if customers need to pay
a signi￿cant mount of money to connect to other networks. Study of the complementary
products market has given rise to another reason for network externalitites. The idea is: if
more consumers choose to use a speci￿c product, there will be more ￿rms that join this
product’s complementary market. Competition among these downstream ￿rms will lower
the price and increase the variety of complementary products, hence increase the utility
of the consumers. These indirect network externalities are found in many IT (information
technology) products, such as platform/software, and can also exist in many traditional
industries, such as automobile/authorized repair agencies.
Indirect network externalities are a potentially important factor that in￿uences con-
sumers when they are choosing products. Generally speaking, the more indirect network
externalities he/she may obtain as a result of purchasing the product, the higher price he/she
would be happy to pay. However, it is very dif￿cult for consumers to predict the future size
of the networks, since it is nearly impossible for everyone have full information about oth-
ers’ choices when making their decisions. In most instances, the consumers evaluate the
size of a network in the current period according to the market size of each ￿rm in the last
period, which is a more accessible piece of public data and can be seen by everyone. Previ-
ous market size determines how many complementary goods are produced and how many
complementary goods developers and suppliers, who are slow or costly to switch, are al-
ready there. It is therefore resonable that consumers prefer products from ￿rms with larger
previous market sizes and are willing to pay more for a product that has established market
53status and reputation in a previous time. This consumer’s behaviour can be explained by the
fact that indirect network externalities are inheritable, which means that an increase in the
number of consumers who use a product in a previous time will increase the utility of the
consumers who choose the same or compatible product in the current period. In this chap-
ter, we assume that ￿rms can only inherit the last period’s indirect network externalities
and that earlier market structure does not affect the current period.
Inheritableindirectnetworkexternalityhassomesimilarcharacteristicswithinstalled
base. However, this special installed base comes from the complementary product market
instead of the product’s market itself. Moreover, installed base does not always bring about
network externalities, which is crucial in our model. Goodwill for reputable brand names
can also bring about similar effect for consumers, but goodwill is not always size deter-
mined and can vary among different consumers.
In the current period, ￿rms can do nothing to in￿uence their previous market size,
which means the sizes of the indirect network externalities they may inherit are determined
by history. However, if a ￿rm acquires another ￿rm, it may inherit indirect network exter-
nalities from the acquired ￿rm by making his product compatible with all acquired ￿rms’
complementary goods. This provides a possibility for ￿rms to change the sizes of the indi-
rect network externalities involved in their current period products and can be an important
motivation for merger and acquisition activities. A good example of this can occur in the
video game console/game software market. One can imagine that a merger between Sony
(PlayStation) and Microsoft (XBox) would allow creation of a new product (PS-XBox)
that is more competitive in the video game marketplace than Nintendo’s Wii, or other sep-
arate brands, since PS-XBox consumers can enjoy all of the games that once could only be
played on either the PlayStation or XBox consoles. Another advantage of the new game
console is that there will exist more game developers for the new PS-Xbox game console,
compared with the case in which two ￿rms haven’t merged. The reason for this is that
those game software developers for PlayStation and XBox, individually, in previous time
may prefer to continue to develop software for the new PS-XBox game station, because
the switch is slow and costly. When a consumer considers purchasing a game console in
54current period, he/she may evaluate how many software and software developers already
exist in the market and form their willingness to pay for PS-XBox. Clearly, consumers will
prefer to pay more for a new, combined game console than previous separate consoles, be-
cause this new game console provides more indirect network externalities and increases
their utilities to purchase this product. The relatively advantage in the product is more sig-
ni￿cant if the new syndicate acquires more ￿rms, but on the other hand, payment for the
acquisition may limit the ￿rms’ bene￿t from the merger. Thus, the market structures (how
many ￿rms in the market and their market size) along with the intensity of the inherited in-
direct network effect determine the ￿rm’s acquisition strategy and the ￿nal location of the
market equilibrium.
In this chapter, we study ￿rm’s acquisition behaviours when they are faceing a given
previous market structure and a prospect of inheriting indirect network externalities from
the ￿rms they acquired. Our model is based on Kamien and Zang’s (1990) acquisition
model. However, the main purpose of Kamien and Zang’s work is to show that mergers are
unlikely to happen in Cournot competitions if there is no other bene￿t for the merger ex-
cept an increase of market concentration. Kamien and Zang derive their conclusion only
from a necessary condition for the merger. In their model, the suf￿cient condition is not
important and is not discussed since mergers may only occur in very limited cases, given
their assumption. If inheritability is considered, the necessary condition for the existence
of an equilibrium, in which some ￿rms are merged, will be greatly relaxed and enumera-
tion is impossible. Thus, in our model, the suf￿cient and necessary condition is critically
important for the antitrust social planner because it provides a more accurate indicator to
when the merged Nash equilibrium can exist. Another interesting topic we investigate is
whether inheritability can motivate ￿rms to merge and how much inheritability affects the
concentration of the market. In a traditional Cournot competition, the ￿rms that have ac-
quired other ￿rms have no advantage in the competition compared with the ￿rms that are
not involved with the merger. This is because ￿rms only compete with their output and the
quality of their products is indifferent. In our model, the inherited indirect network exter-
nalities provide certain advantages to the ￿rm that acquires others ￿rms since consumers
55will likely pay more for the products with more inherited network externalities. Firms that
acquire others may use this advantaged to squeeze more pro￿ts from their consumers and
increase their output. Moreover, ￿rms that successfully set up their output advantage in the
current period might secure an advantage position in the next round of mergers and acqui-
sitions. This can explain why it is easier for a larger ￿rm to acquire smaller ￿rm than the
other way around and why the markets always tend to be more asymmetric without other
exogenous forces, although the merged Nash equilibrium that will be played is random.
In the literature, horizontal merger is always thought to be a phenomenon that re-
quires study and regulation, since antitrust social planners believe that such a merger has
great potential to reduce competition and social welfare. However, Salant et al (1983)
points out that mergers are much easier said than done. They ￿nd that, in the Cournot com-
petition model, mergers may only occur when they include more than 80 percent of the
￿rms in the industry. This is because the merged entities must be able to generate more
pro￿t than the sum of the separate pieces did before the merger. Given further discussion
of the process of a merger through acquisition, Kamien and Zang (1990) indicate that no
merger can happen in an industry with more than seven ￿rms if the demand function is con-
cave. This can be explained by the fact that each merged entity desires to make at least what
it could, in terms of pro￿tability, by unilaterally abandoning the merger. If a linear demand
function is employed in Kamien and Zang’s model, merger through acquisition only ex-
ists for an industry with no more than two competitors. Merger under the Bertrand model,
with differentiated products, is studied by Denrckere and Davidson (1984, 1985), but ac-
quisition in a Bertrand competition is also limited because the value of the fringe ￿rm may
increases when the industry becomes more concentrated (Kosenok, 2005). Stigler (1950)
points out another consideration that may reduce the chances of the merger, which is that
￿rms that stay outside of the merger can bene￿t more than those ￿rms that are involved.
Although Inderst and Wey (2004) suggest that this insiders’ dilemma can be solved similar
to a public goods problem, it is natural for us to believe that other motivations to explain a
￿rm’s enthusiasm to merge are likely.
56As to the motivation of mergers from the supply side, Perry and Porter (1985) use an
alternative cost function to show that the mergers may create cost ef￿ciencies, which makes
merger easier to exist than in Salant’s estimation. Farrel and Shapiro (1990) give a further
investigation and indicate that the merger may have a positive impact on social welfare if
the synergy of the merger is considered. From the demand side, Cheung (1992) shows that
Salant’s threshold may be relaxed to 50% if the demand satis￿es the marginal revenue of
the industry is decreasing. Fauli-Oller (1997) ￿nds that the pro￿tability of mergers may de-
pend on the degree of concavity of the demand function. In our model, the demand function
may varies with the merger result, while ￿rms can change the demand function by choosing
different acquisition strategies. However the demand function is linear and ￿xed after the
merger is ￿nished. Huck, Konrad and Muller (2004) provide additional reasons for merg-
ers, including internal organization of the ￿rm, the time structure of decision making, the
information aspect of competition, etc. However, size depended inheritable resource from
the acquired ￿rms, which can be an important reason for the merger, is not investigated in
extant literature while neither is the suf￿cient and necessary conditions for the existence of
a merged Nash equilibrium discussed in the literature.
The direct network effect is ￿rstly modeled by Katz and Shapiro (1985). They also
suggest, in another paper, that ￿hardware/software system can be seen as vertical network
which has similar properties as direct network￿ (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Empirical analy-
sis shows that this indirect network effect may be important in video game (Clements and
Ohashi, 2005) or personal digital assistant market (Nair et al, 2004). Economides and
White (1998) suggest that the indirect network may be seen as a two-way network and
there are other works (Church and Gandal, 1992; Chon and Shy, 2002) in which the au-
thors try to model this indirect network effect in different markets. More recently, Church
et al (2008) review development of the indirect network theory and provide the condition
for the existence of the adoption externalities in indirect network industries. Our thesis’s
indirect network theory is based on these works. We assume that the indirect network effect
is inheritable and offer further discussion on its effects to mergers and acquisitions.
57In Section 2.2, we discuss the suf￿cient and necessary conditions for the existence of
a Nash equilibrium, in which some ￿rms are merged. The model in Section 2.2 is based
on a symmetric initial market and a linear network utility function. In Section 2.3, we
investigate whether the larger ￿rms have an advantage in an asymmetric market and try to
discuss whether inheriting indirect network externalities can be an incentive for the ￿rms’
acquisition behaviors. The possibility of market structure changes under our assumption
and its implication to social planners are also discussed in this section. The last section of
this chapter provides our conclusion and offers future possible work relative to this chapter.
582.2 The Symmetric Model
2.2.1 The Model
Assume there are n (n > 2) symmetric ￿rms in an oligopoly market and that these ￿rms
produce homogeneous products and choose their output to maximize pro￿ts. The merger
and acquisition between these ￿rms is processed in two stages: in the ￿rst stage, every
￿rm simultaneously selects a bid vector that includes the bids for all the other ￿rms and
the reservation price for himself. Then, the ￿rms merge according to speci￿c rules and the
chosen bid vector. In this step, some ￿rms take the bid offer and leave the market. After
observing the acquisition result, consumers form their valuations for each survived ￿rm’s
products or services. Here, we assume the more ￿rms a ￿rm acquires, the more indirect
network externalities this ￿rm may provide to consumers. Consequently, consumers will
value this ￿rm’s products or services more. In the second stage of the merger and acquisi-
tion game, survived ￿rms compete with their output to maximize pro￿ts according to the
consumer’s valuations. The producing cost is not considered in this model. The entire
merger process is one-off, thus, the ￿rms are myopic and do not consider the next round
bid. In the following paper, we denote the ￿rms that accept the bid offer and leave the
market as the sellers. And we denote the ￿rms that acquire at least one ￿rm as the buyers.





Here, we denote ￿rm i’s bid for ￿rm j as b
j
i and ￿rm i’s reservation price (bid for itself) as
bi
i. Since all the ￿rms are symmetric, ￿rms always prefer operating themselves to acquiring




i (j 6= i).
4 After all the ￿rms select his bid vector, each ￿rm receives an offer





n). Firms merge according to
the following rules: if there exists a bi
q 2 B0
i (q 6= i) for which bi
q > bi
j (j = 1::n), we
call ￿rm q a potential buyer of ￿rm i. Here, we assume that when ￿rm i receives an offer
4 This assumption can successfully avoid the acquisition dilemma, which is the situation that Firm A may
acquire Firm B, Firm B may acquire Firm C and Firm C may acquire Firm A. Proof can be found in the
Appendix.
59equal to its reservation price, the ￿rm will prefer to accept the offer and leave the market to
avoid the uncertainty of the competition. If there does not exist such bi
q (￿rm i’s reservation
price is larger than any offer), ￿rm i will not be acquired by any ￿rm and will remain until
the next stage. If there is more than one potential buyer (these potential buyers provide
the same offer to ￿rm i), the potential buyer with the highest rank will win the bid (￿rm
i’s rank is i, which is an arti￿cial, exogenous variable). We also assume that ￿rms will
￿rst consider selling themselves. If the ￿rm cannot ￿nd a buyer, it then begins to consider
acquiring others ￿rms. After the market is restructured by the acquisition procedure, we
assume there are only m (m 6 n) ￿rms left in the market and each of these has acquired




As is known, the indirect network externalities that consumers can obtain from the
buyer are determined by the total initial market size of all the ￿rms that the buyer acquires.
We denote the market size of ￿rm i at the beginning of the merger as x0
i. Since the ￿rms are
symmetric, there is: x0
1 = x0
2 = ::: = x0
n = x0. We also simply assume, before the merger
and acquisition process, that these n ￿rms compete in a standard Cournot model with the
following price function:




















If ￿rm l, a buyer, acquires more ￿rms in the ￿rst stage of the game, its products or services
will carry more indirect network externalities and be more valuable to consumers. Similar
to the network externality utility function, this utility function should be characterized as:
u(0) = 0;u(x) > 0;u0(x) > 0 and u00(x) 6 0. For convenience of calculation, we may
assume the utility function of indirect network externalities to be linear as: u(x) = bx
60(0 < b < 1). Here, b is the measure of the intensity of the indirect network externality. We
also assume the price of ￿rm l’s product is determined by the function:











Thus, ￿rm l’s pro￿t is:







From the ￿rst order condition, we can obtain the optimized output of ￿rm l, xM
l , is the







xi ￿ xl = 0 (2.1)
Since these are m ￿rms left after the merger, there exists m solution functions in the same



















(m + 1)(n + 1)
= z (2.2)
Here, z is the total output after the merger. Since b < 1, nb
n+1 < 1 and z < 1. We may
easily get @z=@m > 0 from equation (2.2). This means that total output will decrease with
the decrease of number of the ￿rms that survive in the last stage, which is coincident with
the standard Cournot competition. We may also ￿nd that @z=@b > 0. This means that the
stronger the indirect network externalities, the more consumers will join the market. These
extra consumers lured by the indirect network externalities to join the market is: nb
(n+1)(m+1).
By substituting z into the optimized output solution function (2.1), we obtain the





























61If ￿rm l seizes more ￿rms from other buyers, kl will increase and m does not change.
From equation (2.3) and (2.4), we can conclude that ￿rm l will have more output and
pro￿ts. Acquiring one more ￿rm will extend the ￿rm’s output by b
n+1. From function (2.2),
we know that the total output, z, does not change if n and m are ￿xed. Thus, if ￿rm l
increases its output by b
n+1, there must exist a buyer who loses the same amount of output.
This is different from Kamien and Zang’s model (1990) or our model in perper-1. In these
models, after the merger, ￿rms compete in a symmetric status. The ￿nal market structure
is symmetric and only determined by how many ￿rms are left after the merger (here is m).
However, in this model, buyers that acquire more ￿rms have larger market share in the
equilibrium. This can provide a clue for us to analyze the incentive of the ￿rms to raise
their bids. It is clear that @xM
l =@m < 0. Thus, if the ￿rm l increases kl by reducing m,
which means the market becomes more concentrated, not only xM
l will increase, but also
all the other ￿rms that remain in the market will bene￿t as well.
2.2.2 Existence of Merged Nash Equilibrium (MNE)
For convenience to denote in this chapter, we make the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 2.1 If the bid game reaches an equilibrium (no ￿rm chooses to change
its bid vector given all the other ￿rms’ bid vectors) and m < n in the equilibrium, we call
this equilibrium a merged Nash equilibrium (MNE).
In MNE, there at least exists one ￿rm who has acquired some other ￿rm in the ￿rst
stage of the game. We assume ￿rm l is a ￿rm that has acquired others. Obviously, ￿rm l
can choose to give up the acquisition by setting its bid for all the other ￿rms at 0. If it does,
the kl ￿ 1 ￿rms, that once may sell themselves to ￿rm l, must get involved in the second
stage of the competition or consider selling themselves to other potential buyers. In this
effect, the total ￿rms left in the second stage will increase to m0 (m + kl ￿ 1 > m0 > m).
Following the procedure of calculating ￿M
l , we can obtain the pro￿ts of ￿rm l when it
62chooses to give up the acquisition in the ￿rst stage as:
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l =@m0 < 0, ￿NM
l reaches the minimum when m0 = m+kl￿1. By substituting
m + kl ￿ 1 into equation (2.5), we may obtain:
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This indicates that ￿rm l can always guarantee ￿NM
l min pro￿t by giving up the acquisition.
Any ￿rm may also make itself un-acquirable by setting its reservation price as in￿n-
ity. If a ￿rm that decides to sell itself to ￿rm l changes its mind and chooses to keep itself
un-acquirable, it may increase the number of the ￿rms that remain to second stage to m+1













If ￿rm l wants to acquire a ￿rm, it must pay at least ￿D to the seller. Otherwise, the seller
will choose to remain un-acquirable. Thus, the minimum payment for the ￿rm l to buy
kl ￿ 1 ￿rms is (ki ￿ 1)￿D.
Proposition 2.1 For a given n and b, the necessary condition for the existence of a





l min > (kl ￿ 1)￿
D (2.7)
Here, n > 2;n > m > 1;n > kl > 2 and b 2 (0;1).
In equation (2.7), ￿M
l ￿ ￿NM
l min is the pro￿t of ￿rm l in acquisition and is also
the maximum amount that ￿rm l is willing to pay. We call this amount the budget of ￿rm
l. This budget must be greater than the minimum payment at which the kl ￿ 1 ￿rms are
willing to merge. Otherwise, either ￿rm l will give up on the acquisition or sellers will
deviate from the merger.
63Proposition 2.2 The necessary condition for the existence of a MNE is relaxed by
the increased intensity of the indirect network externalities.
From equation (2.6), we know that the increase of b will decrease the incentive of the
sellers to deviate in most of the cases
5. The greater the indirect network externalities, the
less buyers must pay for the acquisition. Let’s assume ￿rm l is the largest buyer, which
means kl > ki (i = 1:::m). From equation (2.3), we know ￿rm l’s pro￿t after merger
increase with the increase of b. The change of b has a different effect to ￿NM
l min when
the number of buyers in the MNE is different. In the case that there is more than one
buyer in the MNE, @xNM
l min=@b < 0 and the buyers will get less from giving up the
acquisition. Thus, the ￿rm l is likely to pay more for the acquisition. If there is only one
buyer in the MNE, we will have @xNM
l min=@b > 0, which means buyers will obtain more
from giving up the acquisition. However, from the left side of the equation (2.7), we have
@(￿M
l ￿ ￿NM
l min)=@b > 0. This indicates that, for ￿rm l, with the increase of b, the
increase of pro￿ts from the merger is greater than the increase of the pro￿ts from giving
up the merger. In both of these cases, the total budget that ￿rm l is willing to pay for
sellers increases with the increase of b. Combining the effect to the seller and the buyer, the
increase of the intensity of indirect network externalities causes ￿rm l’s budget to increase
and makes sellers are happy to accept a lower offer. We can conclude that the necessary
condition for the existence of an MNE will relax.
In Kamien and Zang’s model (1990), a MNE only exists for a relatively small n. Es-
pecially when the price function is linear, a MNE only exists for n = 2. This is because the
pro￿t from the merger is very low and the incentive for the sellers to deviate is relatively
large if we do not consider any other bene￿t of the acquisition. However, in the real world,
mergers happen more frequently than Kamien and Zang’s (1990) declaration, which may
be explained partly by Proposition 2.2. If we consider indirect network externalities, ￿rms
will be rewarded more for their acquisition behaviors. With the increase of the intensity of
5 When and only when m = n ￿ 1, the deviation pro￿t of the sellers increases with the increase of b. This
special case is discussed in a separate section in the following part of this paper. Proposition 2.2 will not be
violated in this special case.
64the indirect network, there are many possible MNEs which may lead to symmetric, asym-
metric equilibrium or monopoly cases. Kamien and Zang (1990) do not discuss suf￿cient
conditions for the existence of a MNE since a possible merger is very limited and can be
solved by enumeration. However, if we consider indirect network externalities, the set of
possible MNEs is relatively large, so the suf￿cient conditions can be important and may
provide additional pro￿les of MNEs.
2.2.1 Merger with a Single Buyer
Similar to MNE, we may give the following de￿nition for convenience to denote in the
paper:
De￿nition 2.2 If the bid game reaches an equilibrium with m < n, and this
equilibrium contains only one buyer, we call this equilibrium single buyer merged Nash
equilibrium (SBMNE). If this MNE contains more than one buyer, we call the equilibrium
multiple buyer merged Nash equilibrium (MBMNE).
If only one buyer exists, the number of ￿rms that are involved in the second step
competition must equal n + 1 ￿ k. Here, we may ignore the subscript of k since only one
k exists in a SBMNE. In a general MNE model, ￿M
l and ￿D are both functions of m and kl
for a given n and b. In this section, we use ￿M(k) and ￿D(k) to denote them because they











2 = C (2.8)
This indicates that ￿NM
l min is a constant number for a given n and b. We de￿ne this
constant number as C.
A Candidate SBMNE and the Suf￿cient Condition for its Existence
65Proposition 2.3 The suf￿cient condition for the existence of a SBMNE is that there
exists a k 2 [2;n], which allows the inequality:
￿
M(k) ￿ C > (k ￿ 1)￿
D(k) (2.9)
hold for a given n > 2 and b 2 (0;1).
If there exists one or more than one k 2 [2;n] that allows the inequality (2.9) hold for
a given n > 2 and b 2 (0;1), we may de￿ne k￿ as the smallest k that makes ￿M(k)￿(k ￿







It is obviously that ￿ is always greater than 0. We call the ￿rms that haven’t been acquired
by the buyer in the SBMNE as non-sellers and the buyer’s pro￿t after paying out the bids
to all sellers as its net pro￿t.
We can construct such a strategy set of a candidate equilibrium:
{buyer’s strategy: (bid for himself: 1, bid for all the sellers: ￿D(k￿) + ￿, bid for all
the non-sellers: 0);
sellers’ strategy: (bid for himself: ￿D(k￿) + ￿, bid for the buyer: 0, bid for all the
other sellers: 0, bid for all the non-sellers: 0);
non-seller’s strategy: (bid for himself: 1, bid for the buyer: 0, bid for all the other
sellers: 0, bid for all the other non-seller: 0)}
If we prove that the above candidate strategy set is an equilibrium, we can conclude
that there always exists a SBMNE since there is only one buyer in this equilibrium.
Analysis of the Candidate Equilibrium
(i) For the buyer’s strategy, given all others’ strategies
Clearly, there is no incentive for the buyer to decrease or increase its bid for itself
since the bids for the buyer from the sellers and the non-sellers are 0. And the buyer has
no incentive to increase its bid for the seller because this will only increase its cost of the
acquisition and decrease its pro￿t. From inequality (2.9), we also know that the buyer has
66no incentive to decrease its bid for all the sellers simultaneously. If the buyer does so, it
will become a non-buyer. Being a non-buyer is never the best strategy since inequality (2.9)
provides potential pro￿tability for the buyer. The buyer also has no incentive to decrease
its bid for part of the sellers. This can be proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 Given the strategies of sellers and non-sellers as the candidate strategy
set, the buyer’s net pro￿t will always be less than C if the buyer chooses to only acquire
fewer than k￿ sellers.
We may assume that the buyer decreases the number of the ￿rms it acquires to k0
(k0 < k￿). Since k￿ is the smallest k that makes the net pro￿t larger than C, the buyer will
obtain less net pro￿t than C if it chooses to only acquire k0 and pay them ￿D(k0). Moreover,
the actual payments for each seller are ￿D(k￿)+￿, which is larger than ￿D(k0). The actual
net pro￿t the buyer can get will be even less if he chooses to acquire just k0 ￿rms. This
means that the buyer has no incentive to decrease its bid for part of the sellers. The buyer
also has no incentive to increase or decrease its bid for the non-sellers since the nonseller’s
bids for themselves are 1. Considering above discussion together, we can conclude that
the buyer has no incentive to change its strategy when all the others’ strategies are given as
the candidate strategy set.
(ii) For the non-sellers, given all others’ strategies
Obviously, the non-sellers have no incentive to increase their bids for the buyer since
the buyer’s bid for itself is 1. Any non-sller has no incentive to increase its bids for other
non-sellers, since all of the non-sellers’ bids for themselves are 1. The non-sellers will
not decrease their bids for themselves because all of the others’ bids for the non-sellers are
0. Any non-seller has no incentive to increase its bids for one, some, or all of the sellers.
This is shown in the following lemma.
67Lemma 2.2 Given the strategies of the buyer, all sellers and all other non-sellers
as the candidate strategy set, any non-seller will have less pro￿t if it chooses to pay more
than ￿D(k￿) + ￿ to acquire one, some, or all of the sellers.
The non-seller may also lure some sellers by raising its bid over ￿D(k￿)+￿. However,
the total number of ￿rms in the last step of the competition will not change and the number
of sellers that the non-seller can acquire is limited, so the non-seller cannot bene￿t from
additional reduction in competition intensity. If the non-seller acquires some sellers, it may
bene￿t from an increase of its products’ indirect network externalities. However, this is
very limited and will be offset by what it needs to pay for the acquisition. The intuition
behind the Lemma 2.2 is the insider’s dilemma, which means it is always better to stay
outside the merger than get into it. Thus, starting a bidding war is not a smart strategy
when the buyer has given a non-pro￿table high bid to sellers. Adding Lemma 2.2 to our
previousdiscussion, wecanconcludethatanoutsiderhasnoincentivetochangeitsstrategy
when all of the others’ strategies do not change.
(iii) For sellers, given all others’ strategies
Clearly, sellers have no incentive to increase their bids for the buyers or the non-
sellers since their bids for themselves are 1. Sellers have no incentive to decrease their
bids for themselves either, since this will only reduce their pro￿ts, while they also have no
incentivetoincreasetheirbidsforthemselvestobeanon-seller, since￿D(k￿)+￿ > ￿D(k￿).
However, the seller may increase its bid for itself and set a bid larger than ￿D(k￿) + ￿ for
some or all the other sellers. This makes the seller become a second buyer and allow it to
snatch some of the ￿rms from the buyer. The following lemma eliminates the idea that this
strategy is better for sellers than our candidate strategy set.
Lemma 2.3 Given the buyer’s strategies, the non-sellers and all of the other sellers
as the candidate strategy set, the seller will obtain less net pro￿t than ￿D(k￿) + ￿ if it
chooses to stay un-acquirable and acquires one, some or all of the rest of the sellers by
offering more than ￿D(k￿) + ￿.
68￿D(k￿) + ￿ is really a decent pay for the seller, which is even larger than the buyer’s
net pro￿t C. If one of the sellers becomes a second buyer, the total number of ￿rms in the
last step of the competition will increase by 1. This means that the second buyer must face
a more intensive competition. If the second buyer stands at the same position as the ￿rst
buyer, it cannot generate a net pro￿t more than C since the number of ￿rms it may acquire
is less than k￿ and k￿ is the smallest k that makes the net pro￿t larger than C. Thus, if the
second buyer must face a even harder competition, what it may generate is even less and
obviously less than the payment from the buyer, ￿D(k￿)+￿. According to Lemma 2.3 and
the discussion above, we can say that sellers have no incentive to change their strategies
given the strategies of buyer and non-sellers as the candidate strategy set.
From (i), (ii) and (iii), we show that the candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium.
Thus, if we have a k 2 [2;n] that lets (2.9) hold, we can ￿nd out k￿ by checking all of
the numbers less than k, and there always exists an equilibrium same as the candidate
equilibrium ￿￿ Proposition 2.3 is proved.
If we combine Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.1, the following corollary is ob-
tained:
Corollary 2.1 For a given n > 2 and b 2 (0;1), the suf￿cient and necessary
condition for the existence of a SBMNE is there exists a k 2 [2;n], which makes ￿M(k) ￿
C > (k ￿ 1)￿D(k).
Two Special Cases of SBMNE
One of the special cases of SBMNE is only two ￿rms are involved in the merger. In
this case, m = n ￿ 1 and k = 2. Substituting m and k into equation (2.9), we may easily
obtain the following proposition:
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, any b that is greater than
p
2￿1 will automatically make (2.11) hold. We can then get the
following corollary.
Corollary 2.2 For any given n > 3 and b >
p
2 ￿ 1, there always exists a SBMNE
in which the buyer only acquires one ￿rm.
From Corollary 2.2, we may also indicate that there always exists a MNE when b
is not less than
p
2 ￿ 1. This Corollary will be helpful when we discuss the existence of
a general MNE since we only need to consider the situation when b is less than a certain
threshold.
Anotherveryimportantspecialcaseistheoneinwhichthemarketbecomesamonopoly
after the acquisition. In this case, m = 1 and k = n. Similar to Proposition 2.4, we can
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5 For any given n > 3, if
b >
(4n3 + 5n2 + 7n + 24 ￿ 6(n + 1)
p
4n3 ￿ 15n + 16)(n + 1)
(4n3 ￿ 25n2 ￿ 35n + 12)n
(2.12)
, there exists an MNE in which the market becomes a monopoly.
Here, the left side of the inequality (2.12) is divergent when n goes to in￿nity. In
order to understand the relationship between these two special cases, we can draw (2.11)
and (2.12) in the following ￿gure:
70Figure-2.1: Two ￿rms merger vs Merger to monopoly
From Figure-2.1, we see (2.11) and (2.12) are monotonic concave functions. With the
increase of n, we need a larger b to satisfy both inequalities. This means we need a larger
indirect network effect for the equilibrium to exist with the increasing of the number of the
￿rms in the market. We may also see the line drawn by condition (2.11) is above the line
drawn by condition (2.12) for n = 3 and 4. For n > 5, (2.12) always locates above (2.11).
This tells us that it is easier for a ￿rm to buy all the other ￿rms (to pursue monopoly) than
just buy only one ￿rm when n is relatively small. However, when n becomes larger, the cost
of the monopoly strategy increases rapidly and a larger indirect network effect is necessary
in order for the monopoly to remain pro￿table. For a relatively large n, a SBMNE with the
merger of just two ￿rms is easier to realize. For the antitrust social planner, when there are
only a few ￿rms in the market and competition is weak, a merger leading to monopoly will
be more likely to happen. However, when the number of ￿rms in the market is large and
highly competitive, the merger is more likely to happen between limited ￿rms.
More generally, the suf￿cient and necessary condition of the existence of a SBMNE
can be seen as a quadratic function of b, given n and k. By solving this function, we may
get b = f(n;k). Plotting f(n;k) with the condition n > k > 2, we obtain the following
￿gure:
71Figure-2.2: b = f(n;k)
Figure-2.2 describes the relationship between b, n and k under the condition of (2.9).
Any point located in the space above the curved surface causes the SBMNE exist. An
interesting proposition here is: if the initial number of ￿rms in the market is given and this
number is larger than 4, the SBMNE that can exist by the smallest b will not be any one of
the special cases we have discussed above. This threshold equilibrium happens when the
buyer chooses a k￿ that is located between 2 and n. This can be explained by a double-
side effect of the acquisition: increasing the value of buyer’s products because of indirect
network externalities and increasing the payment for sellers. From Figure-2.2, we can also
guess that k￿ will become smaller with the increase of n and ￿nally converge at a value
when n goes to in￿nity. This will be left to future work.
2.2.1 Merger with Multiple Buyers
When n = 2 and 3, there is no MBMNE. Thus, we only need to consider the situation that
n > 4. The simplest multiple buyer merge equilibrium is the one in which there are two
buyers and each has acquired one seller. This is the only possible MBMNE when n = 4.
72Proposition 2.6 When n = 4, the suf￿cient and necessary condition for the existence





By substituting n = 4;m = 2 and k = 2 into (2.7), we can easily check the necessity
of Proposition 2.6. For suf￿ciency, we may construct a candidate equilibrium:




for Seller B and the second buyer: 0);




bid for Seller A and the ￿rst buyer: 0);
Seller A’s strategy: (bid for himself: ( 2
15b + 1
3)2 ￿ 1
16, bid for the two buyers: 0, bid
for Seller B: 0);
Seller B’s strategy: (bid for himself: ( 2
15b + 1
3)2 ￿ 1
16, bid for the two buyers: 0, bid
for Seller A: 0)}




3, this candidate equilibrium is an MBMNE.
This provides us the suf￿ciency for Proposition 2.6.
When n = 4, three possible SBMNEs exist: (k = 2;m = 3), (k = 3;m = 2) and
(k = 4;m = 1). Substituting these three SBMNEs into inequality (2.9), we can obtain the














3, so an MBMNE is easier
to exist than an SBMNE.
Proposition 2.7 For any n > 9, if an MBMNE exists, an SBMNE must exist at the
same time.
We de￿ne a function:






For any n > 9 and b >
p
2 ￿ 1, we have @f(m)=@m < 0
6 if we assume n, k and b are
￿xed. According to Proposition 2.1, if an MBMNE exists, we must have an m and k that
6 The proof is in Appendix
73makes the inequality (2.7) hold. Let’s de￿ne m￿ and k￿ as such a pair that can ful￿ll these
conditions. Since it is an MBMNE, we must have m￿ + k￿ ￿ 1 < n. So there exists a
m￿ > m￿ which makes m￿+k￿￿1 = n. Because @f(m)=@m < 0, f(m￿) < f(m￿) < 0
for a given n, k￿ and b. By substituting m￿ = n+1￿k￿ into f(m￿) < 0, we may ￿nd that
the k￿ can make the inequality (2.9) in Proposition 2.3 hold. Thus, an SBMNE must exist
with only one buyer that has acquired k￿ ￿ 1 ￿rms. Proposition 2.7 shows us that if an
MBMNE exists, the equilibrium, which is constructed by leaving one buyer and separating
all the other mergers, will also exist if n > 9.
Combining Proposition 2.6 and 2.7, we may indicate that, when n is relatively small,
an MBMNE may exist with a smaller b than an SBMNE. However, when n becomes larger
than a certain number, the requirement for the existence of an SBMNE is weaker than the
requirement for the existence of an MBMNE. If the indirect network effect is not strong
enough to make an SBMNE exist, an MBMNE will not exist either. Therefore, in a market
with suf￿cient competition, the social planners only need to focus on the existence of an
SBMNE. If they ￿nd that the market is not ready for an SBMNE, an MBMNE will also be
impossible. This can be concluded in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.3 For n > 9, the suf￿cient and necessary condition for the existence of
a MNE is there exists a k 2 [2;n] which makes the inequality (2.9) hold.
For n = 5;6;7;8;9, we may test one by one to see whether they satisfy the Corollary
2.3 using a procedure that is very similar to the proof for Proposition 2.6.
742.3 Acquisition with Asymmetric Market Size
2.3.1 Asymmetric Acquisition and the Advantage of the Larger Firm
Assume there are n ￿rms at the beginning of the merger and that these ￿rms have different
market sizes in the previous period. Without losing generality, we can assume their initial
market sizes are x0
1 > x0
2 > ::: > x0
n. We also assume that consumers are uniformly




i < 1. Suppose there are two ￿rms A and B, which both want to buy r ￿rms
and x0
A > x0
B. For ease of denotation, we name these r ￿rms: s1;s2:::sr. Similar to the
model above, we still have a linear indirect network utility function: u(x) = bx.
Proposition 2.8 If a ￿rm with larger initial market size cannot bene￿t from acquiring
a set of ￿rms, all other ￿rms with smaller initial market sizes cannot bene￿t from acquiring
this set of ￿rms either.
First, we consider the situation of Firm B = 2 (s1;s2:::sr) when Firm A is the buyer
and Firm A = 2 (s1;s2:::sr) when Firm B is the buyer. Following the procedure we use
with the symmetric model, we can get the necessary condition for ￿rm A to acquire these
r ￿rms is:
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si ￿ Z(m + 1))
2 = ￿
D (2.13)
and the necessary condition for ￿rm B to acquire these r ￿rms is:
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si ￿ Z(m + 1))
2 = ￿
D (2.14)
Here, Z(x) is a function of total market output and x is the number of ￿rms in the competi-
tion. From equation (2.2), we know that total market output after the merger only depends
75on m and will not change with the change of buyers and sellers. So z can be written as a
function of the number of ￿rms in the competition. PA and PB is the maximum value that
Firm A and Firm B are willing to pay for the acquisition. ￿D is what both ￿rms need to
pay to prevent deviation of sellers.









si + Z(m + r) ￿ Z(m)) (2.15)
Since @Z(x)=@x > 0, we can obtain Z(m+r) > Z(m). So PA > PB. This means that the
larger ￿rm is easier to allow the necessary condition hold and Proposition 2.8 is proved.
If the target acquisition ￿rms are identical, the total deviation payment for these ￿rms
is the same for all buyers. Thus, the right sides of the inequality (2.13) and (2.14) are both
￿D. However, the ￿rm with a larger initial market size has the ability to pay more for the
acquisition than the ￿rm with smaller initial market size. This means that the larger ￿rm
may have an advantage in the acquisition compared with the smaller ￿rm. Because they
bene￿t more, larger ￿rms are willing to pay more. Thus, the equilibrium is more likely
to occur with a larger ￿rm as the buyer. From (2.15), we ￿nd that PA ￿ PB increases
with the increase of x0
A ￿ x0
B, b and r. This indicates that the advantage of the larger
￿rm in the acquisition will be more signi￿cant if this ￿rm is leading more in market size
at the beginning of the merger; the indirect network effect is stronger and the size of the
acquisition is larger.
The other case is Firm B 2 (s1;s2:::sr) when Firm A is the buyer and Firm A 2
(s1;s2:::sr) when Firm B is the buyer. The necessary condition for the Firm A and B to
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2 (2.17)





B)(Z(m + r) ￿ Z(m + 1)) > 0 (2.18)
76We can indicate that in this case, Proposition 2.8 also holds. Similar to equation (2.15), the
advantage of the larger ￿rm in the acquisition increases with the increase of x0
A￿x0
B, b and
r. However, when r = 1, this advantage disappears simply because the left side of (2.18)
goes to 0. This tells us that, for a merger in which only Firm A and B are involved, the
larger ￿rm, A, has no advantage in the acquisition compared with the smaller one, B. In
this special case, Firm A and B have an identical chance as the buyer. The advantage of
larger initial market size can only be shown in a merger that occurs with the introduction
of more ￿rms.
In the case that ￿rms merge to form a monopoly, we may obtain the following corol-
lary:
Corollary 2.4 If the ￿rm with largest previous market size can not afford an
acquisition, other ￿rms can not afford this acquisition either.
2.3.1 The Incentive of the Acquisition and Dynamic Market Structure
The incentive of the ￿rm to be a buyer in an MNE is relatively weak and ￿rms are all want
to be a non-seller if there is only one period. We can ￿nd this by comparing the bene￿t of
the buyer, the sellers and the non-sellers in the candidate equilibrium in Section 2.2.3. In
this equilibrium, the bene￿t of the non-seller can be calculated by using the pro￿t of the
non-seller after the merger, minus the pro￿t if the merger doesn’t occur, which is:
MBnon￿seller = (
1
n + 2 ￿ k
+
b(2 ￿ k)
(n + 1)(n + 2 ￿ k)
)
2 ￿ C
From MBnon￿seller > 0 for any k > 2,
7 we know that non-sellers always bene￿t from
the mergers no matter how many ￿rms are acquired by the buyer because they can obtain
more pro￿ts by the decreasing number of the competitors, which can be seen from 1
n+2￿k ￿
7 It is because
(
1
n + 2 ￿ k
+
b(2 ￿ k)
(n + 1)(n + 2 ￿ k)
) ￿ C =
(k ￿ 1)(b ￿ 1)
(n + 1)(n + 2 ￿ k)
+
b(k ￿ 1)
(n + 1)2(n + 2 ￿ k)
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n+1 > 0. Although non-sellers will suffer some loss from relatively small indirect network
externalities (
b(2￿k)
(n+1)(n+2￿k) < 0), this loss never exceeds what these ￿rms gain from the
reduction of the competition. The bene￿ts of sellers can be calculated using the payment
from the buyer, minus the pro￿t if the merger doesn’t occur, which is:
MBseller = (￿
D(k
￿) + ￿) ￿ C
From MBseller > 0 for any k > 2,
8 we know the seller can always bene￿t from the merger
as well and the reason is the same as that for the non-seller. The difference is, the non-seller
may obtain more bene￿t than the seller, since MBnon￿seller ￿MBseller > 0 for any k > 2.
From (2.10), which is the expression of ￿, we may conclude that the buyer’s bene￿t is 0 in
our candidate equilibrium. There may exist some other equilibrium by which the buyer’s
bene￿t is not 0, via bargaining the offer with the sellers. However, the buyer’s bargaining
power is limited, since it needs to deter sellers or nonsellers from becoming second buyers
by offering a very high bid.
If the ￿rms that survive the current round of merger face another round of the merger,
the buyer may have additional bargaining power for the acquisition in the next period than
it has in the current period. An important reason for this is that the market would become
asymmetric and lead by the buyer. The buyer, whose product has more indirect network
externalities, creats more output in the last round of the merger and will become a larger
￿rm compared with the non-sellers at the beginning of the next round of the merger game.
From Proposition 2.8, we know that larger ￿rms have some advantage and that this advan-
tage is affected by the ￿rm’s initial market size. Thus, we might face a situation in which,
in the second round acquisition game just after an SBMNE, only the buyer in the previ-
ous round of the game can ￿nd a k that will satisfy the condition (2.13) or (2.16), and all
other non-sellers cannot satisfy (2.14) or (2.17). In this situation, only one ￿rm, the buyer
in previous period, has the chance to acquire others and no others ￿rms have the ability to
8 This is because
(
1
n + 3 ￿ k
+
b(3 ￿ k)
(n + 1)(n + 3 ￿ k)
) ￿ C =
nb(k ￿ 2)
(n + 1)2(n + 3 ￿ k)
78host a merger. In this situation, the buyer does not need to offer a signi￿cant price premium
to sellers in the second round of the game to deter a potential bidding war. Moreover, the
buyer also generates more pro￿t by providing products with higher indirect network ex-
ternalities to consumers. Combined with the pro￿t of these two periods, the buyers will
obtain compensation for what they lost at the ￿rst period. Thus, the incentive of the ￿rms
to become a buyer in the ￿rst period increases.
If there is only one period, the maximum number of ￿rms that the buyer may acquire
is easy to predict by the suf￿cient and necessary condition (2.9). The buyer’s ambition
is constrained by the number of ￿rms (n) and the intensity of indirect network external-
ities (b). The buyer cannot acquire as many ￿rms as it expects (for example, merge to
monopoly) when n is too large and b is too small, which has been illustrated in the Figure-
2.2. However, if there is more than one round of the merger game, social planners should
notice that the limits of concentration of the market in the ￿rst period can be exceeded via
a two step acquisition. Sometimes, if the buyer acquires too many ￿rms in the ￿rst period,
the merger stops in the second period because the buyer and the non-seller in the second
period are both unable to satisfy the necessary conditions. However, limited acquisition in
the ￿rst period may open the possibility for additional acquisitions in the future and lead
to a more concentrated market. Thus, an equilibrium in which that the buyer acquires a
very large number of ￿rms in the ￿rst period may not always lead to the most concentrated
market structure. All of the possibilities above will be shown in the following example.
For example, we assume n = 100;b = 0:21. There are 30 possible SBMNE since
any k 2 [20;49] may satisfy the inequality (2.9). If equilibrium in the ￿rst period is located
at k = 49, the market goes to the most possible concentration and a MNE cannot be found
in the future period acquisition game. This is because, in the next period, the total number
of ￿rms in the market will be 52. For the buyer, we cannot ￿nd a r 2 [1;51] which may
satisfy (2.13) or (2.16). From Proposition 2.8, we know that all other ￿rms cannot be the
buyer as well in this situation. Thus, there will be no merger in the future rounds of the
game. However, if equilibrium in the ￿rst period is located at k = 30, we have n = 71
after the ￿rst period. In the next period, only the buyer in last round of the game may host a
79merger. This is because inequality (2.14) and (2.17) may not hold for any n = 71;b = 0:21
and r 2 [1;70]. However, the inequality (2.13) may hold for r 2 [9;27]. If r = 27, the
number of ￿rms left in the market after the second round of the merger is 44, which is less
than 52. We may conclude that two-step merger may lead to a more concentrated market
structure. In the case that k = 30, if there is no discount for time, the total pro￿t of the
non-seller in two periods is around 0:00049. Although the buyer will get 0 pro￿t in the ￿rst
period, it may get around 0:00036 pro￿t after payments for sellers in the second period if
equilibrium is located at r = 20. If there is no merger in the second period, the buyer will
obtain around 0:00070, which is signi￿cantly greater than the total pro￿t of the non-seller
of approximately 0:00036.
Fromthisexample, weseethatamergerwithagreatincreaseofmarketconcentration
may not always be the worst thing for antitrust social planners since it may prevent future
mergers. In addition, a merger with only limited ￿rms involved should not be treated lightly
since it may lead to a merger with more participating ￿rms.
802.4 Conclusions and Future Work
Inheritable indirect network externalities can be a very important factor that require consid-
eration when we analyze ￿rm acquisition behaviors. The possibility of inheriting market-
size-determined network resources may encourage ￿rms to acquire other ￿rms. Hence, the
merged Nash equilibrium can more easily exist than the situation in which there is no other
bene￿t for the merger except a reduction of competition. We also ￿nd that the single buyer
merged Nash equilibrium can more easily exist than a multi-buyer merged Nash equilib-
rium when the number of ￿rms in the market is relatively large. If social planners ￿nd out
that a single buyer merger is not possible given current market conditions, they may also
rule out multi-buyer mergers. With the suf￿cient and necessary condition for the merged
Nash equilibrium that we indicate in this paper, social planners may more accurately pre-
dict whether a merger will create a concern and may determine how to regulate it properly
if so. However, the model is based on a linear indirect network externality function and
the suf￿cient and necessary condition in a more general utility function would be valuable
future work since it can be helpful for social planners to use to solve more general cases.
After calculating the buyer’s, seller’s and non-seller‘s bene￿ts from the merger, we ￿nd that
buyer does not obtain as much bene￿t from the merger as the seller and the non-seller if the
model only has one period. This coincides with what we see in the stock market, wherein
the buyer’s stock price decreases while the seller’s stock price increases after the merger an-
nouncement. However, the acquisition provides the buyer an advantage in the competition
with the outsiders and creates more output since the acquisition allows the buyer’s products
to become more valuable to the consumers due to an increase of indirect network external-
ities. Although buyers needs to pay for obtaining this advantage and may only share a very
small part of the bene￿t from the concentration of the market compared with the sellers
and non-sellers in current period, this advantage may bring about signi￿cant pro￿ts to the
buyer in future competition. Moreover, in some special cases, only larger ￿rms can ac-
quire smaller ￿rms, while smaller ￿rms cannot acquire larger ones. Even in the case that
all ￿rms have an equal chance to acquire others, larger ￿rms can afford higher payments
81than smaller ￿rms. Thus, those ￿rms with larger market sizes always ￿nd it easier to win
bidding wars. This gives the merged entities a better chance to boost their leading market
positions and the market may move towards a more concentrated structure endogenously.
In this paper, we only provide some examples and use a static model to show the possibility
that merged entities uses their market size advantages to capture future addtional revenue.
If we seek to model the whole process and detail the ￿rm’s strategy and behavior when
￿rms are forward looking, a dynamic model would be more accurate and necessary. The
incentive for the ￿rms to sell themselves and leave the market, such as facing better oppor-
tunity in other markets, could also be added into the model to more accurately simulate the
real world.
822.5 Appendix
A2.1 Proof of Footnote 4
If Firm A can acquire Firm B, we have bB
A > bB
B. If Firm B can acquire Firm C, we have
bC
B > bC
C. According to our assumption bi
i > b
j







C. Thus, we may indicate that bA
A > bA
C. This means Firm C’s bid for Firm A is
always less than Firm A’s reservation price and Firm C is not able to acquire ￿rm A. The
merger dilemma does not exist.
A2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Assume an MNE exists and there does not exist a pair of m and k which let inequality
(2.7) hold. In the MNE, the buyer has to pay (k ￿ 1)￿D to keep the sellers from deviating.
However, the maximum pro￿ts the buyer can obtain from the acquisition process is ￿M
l ￿
￿NM
l min which is always less than what it has to pay to keep the merger. Hence, the buyer
always has incentive to deviate from the equilibrium by setting itself as a non-buyer. This
is contradict to our assumption. Thus, we can say there does not exist any MNE if there
does not exist a pair of m and k which let inequality (2.7) hold or there exists a pair of
m and k which let inequality (2.7) hold is the necessary condition for the existence of an
MNE for a given n and b.
A3: The proof of Proposition 2.2
If there exists an MNE, we have m 6 n ￿ 1. If m = n ￿ 1, only 2 ￿rms get merged in the
￿rst step of the game and we can rewrite the equation (2.7) as equation (2.11). It is easy to
￿nd that larger b makes the inequality (2.11) easier to hold when n is ￿xed.













83So ￿D decreases with an increase of b.









We also know m + kl ￿ 1 6 n. If m + kl ￿ 1 < n, we can get:

















































































In equation (2.21), we have:


















n + 3 ￿ k
> 0


















n + 3 ￿ k
> 0
Combining (2.22) and (2.23), we can indicate @(￿M
l ￿ ￿NM
l )=@b > 0 if m + kl ￿ 1 = n.
Thus, the left side of the equation (2.7) increases with an increase of b.
Comparing the change of the left side of the equation (2.7) with the change of ￿D,
we can conclude that, for the largest buyer, the necessary condition for the existence of an
MNE will get relaxed by a larger b.
84A2.4 Proof of Lemma 2.1
If the buyer partly decreases its bid for the sellers, total ￿rms acquired by the buyer will
be reduced to k0 ￿ 1. Obviously k0 < k￿. Given that the strategies of the sellers and
non-sellers are ￿xed, the pro￿ts of the buyer from the acquisition with the new strategy is























































A2.5 Proof of Lemma 2.2
If one of the non-sellers sets its bid for some of the sellers higher than ￿D(k￿)+￿, this non-
seller may snatch some ￿rms from the buyer. We assume this non-seller snatches k00 ￿ 1
￿rms from the buyer and its bid for these sellers is ￿D(k￿) + ￿0. Here 2 6 k00 6 k￿ and
￿0 > ￿. Although this non-seller snatched some ￿rms from the buyer, the total number of
￿rms in the second stage competition hasn’t changed and this number is:
Q =
n + 1 ￿ k￿ + nb
n+1
n + 1 ￿ k￿ + 1
From the ￿rst-order condition of the pro￿t function of this non-seller, we can obtain its
output, when the strategy we have de￿ned is chosen, is:
x
￿




85And its pro￿t after the acquisition is:
￿
￿










Given k￿, we can indicate that the net pro￿t of the non-seller from snatching k00 ￿rms from























￿) + ￿) = C
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Since the quadratic function P(k00) is convex and P(1) > P(k￿), we may conclude that
P(k00) < P(1) for any 2 6 k
00 6 k￿. Since P(1) is the pro￿t of this non-seller acquiring
nobody, we may say acquiring nobody is always a better strategy than acquiring no more
than k￿ ￿ 1 ￿rms.
A2.6 Proof of Lemma 2.3
If one of the sellers becomes a second buyer, the total number of ￿rms in the last step
competition will increase 1 to
Q
0 =
n + 2 ￿ k￿ + nb
n+1
n + 3 ￿ k￿ > Q
Assume this seller acquires k000 ￿ 1 ￿rms and its bid to these sellers is ￿D(k￿) + ￿0. Here
2 6 k000 6 k￿ and ￿0 > ￿. Following the identical procedure as the proof of Lemma 2.2, we
86can obtain the bene￿t for the seller being a second buyer is:






































D(2) + ￿ = C + ￿ > C (2.25)
Combining (2.24) and (2.25), we can get:
￿
D(k
￿) + ￿ > C > Ps
This means the seller will always obtain less than ￿D(k￿)+￿ pro￿t if it tries to be a second
buyer.
A2.7 Proof of Proposition 2.4
In the second stage of the game, if only one buyer exists and this buyer only acquires one
￿rm, we have m = n ￿ 1 and k = 2 by the de￿nition of m and k. Hence, ￿M(k), ￿NM(k)


































By solving this inequality for b, we can obtain (2.11). This means that, for any n > 3,
if b satis￿es (2.11), there exists a k = 2 which makes inequality (2.9) hold. According
to Proposition 2.2, we always have an SBMNE if the inequality (2.9) holds. We can then
conclude that there exists an SBMNE in which the buyer only acquires one ￿rm (k = 2),
if b satis￿es (2.11).
87A2.8 Proof of Proposition 2.5
If the market ￿nally becomes a monopoly, the only possibility is one buyer acquired all the
other ￿rms. Thus, this MNE must be a SBMNE with m = 1 and k = n according to our
















































By solving the above inequality, we can get (2.12). This means, for any n > 3, if we have a
b which satis￿es (2.12) , the inequality (2.9) will hold when k = n. From Proposition 2.3,
we know that an SBMNE must exist in which all the ￿rms merge to become a monopoly.
A2.9 Proof of the suf￿ciency of Proposition 2.6










3, we have inequality (2.7). Thus, the ￿rst buyer has no incentive
to decrease its bid for Seller A. Obviously the ￿rst buyer also has no incentive to increase
its bid for Seller A because this will decrease its net pro￿t. The ￿rst buyer has no incentive
to decrease or increase its bid for the second buyer since the second seller’s bid for itself is
1. The ￿rst buyer may increase its bid for Seller B in order to snatch Seller B from the



































We know the net pro￿t, that the ￿rst buyer may get if he chooses the strategy as our candi-
date equilibrium, is 1
42, so the ￿rst buyer will not choose to snatch Seller B from the second
88buyer. Obviously the ￿rst buyer has no incentive to change its bid for itself since all the
others only bid 0 for him. In a conclusion, the ￿rst buyer has no incentive to change its
strategy when other players’ strategies are ￿xed as the candidate equilibrium.
(ii) For the Seller A, ￿xed the strategy of all other three ￿rms
If Seller A chooses to deviate, he may get 1


















Thus, Seller A has no incentive to simply increase its bid for itself and deviate from the
acquisition. He also has no incentive to decrease his bid for himself because this will only
decrease his pro￿t. Seller A has no incentive to increase his bid for the two buyers since
the buyers’ bids for themselves are 1. He may choose to increase his bid for Seller B to a
number larger than ( 2
15b+ 1
3)2 ￿ 1
16 and increase his bid for himself to 1 at the same time.





















Thus, Seller A will not choose this strategy. In a conclusion, seller A has no incentive to
change its strategy when other players’ strategies are ￿xed as the candidate equilibrium.
The analysis of the second buyer and seller B is similar to (i) and (ii), since the
equilibrium is symmetric and the two buyers and two sellers are in an identical position.





the suf￿ciency of Proposition 2.6 is proved.
A2.10 Proof of Proposition 2.7
We de￿ne a function:
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(m + 2)2 +
1
(m + k)2 ￿
k
(m + 1)2
It is easy to test that ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 0 when n > 5,. From Corollary 2.2, we also know
that there always exists an SBMNE if b >
p
2 ￿ 1. So, here, we only need to consider the
situation in which b <
p





(n + 1) > (n + 1 ￿ bn)￿ + b￿
> (n + 1 ￿ (
p





2)(m + k ￿ 1) + 1)￿ + (
p
2 ￿ 1)￿ (2.26)
We plot the right side of (2.26) in the following ￿gure:
Figure-2.3
From Figure-2.3, we can see that only 11 pair of m and k will make the right side of
(2.26) be negative. They are (m = 1;k = 3;4;5;6;7), (m = 2;k = 2;3;4), (m = 3;k =
2;3) and (m = 4;k = 2). By the de￿nition of m and k, we know n < m￿k. Hence, when








A2.11 Some calculations in the example of Section 2.3.2





2 ￿ 0:000098 ￿ (k ￿ 1)(
0:792
102 ￿ k
+ 0:00208k) > 0 (2.27)
By solving (2.27), we may get 49:5 > k > 20:96. Since k is a natural number, k 2 [20;49].
If k = 30, m = 71 in the ￿rst period and buyer’s market size is:
x
0








(m + 1)(n + 1)
= 0:07338
The non-seller’s market size is:
x
0








(m + 1)(n + 1)
= 0:01308













Z(m + r) = 0:98899
Thus, the inequality (2.13) can be written as:





2 ￿ (1 + bx
0
A ￿ Z(m + r))
2
> r(1 + bx
0
B ￿ Z(m + 1))
, which may be solved and get r 2 [9;27]. The inequality (2.14) can be written as:





2 ￿ (1 + bx
0
B ￿ Z(m + r))
2
> r(1 + bx
0
B ￿ Z(m + 1))
, which has no solution when r > 0.
The case when k = 49 may be solved in a very similar way.
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93Chapter 3
Locked-in by Contract, Competition and
Network Externalities
Abstract
This paper investigates a single period Cournot competition model in duopoly market with
some of the consumers are locked by the contract. The number of the consumers who
have been locked by each ￿rm is exogenous. We reveal that multiple equilibria may exist,
while the ￿rms and social planner always have con￿icting incentives in the selection of
the equilibrium. In an extended discussion, we add network externalities and asymmetric
initial market structure into our model. We show that the ￿rm with more initial locked-
in consumers have an advantage in the competition if there exists a network effect. This
advantage will be extended when the intensity of the network effect increases. Hence,
obtaining more locked-in consumers could be an important incentive for the ￿rms to merge
in network world.
943.1 Introduction
In the current information economy, many service providers, such as Telecommunications
companies and Internet service providers (ISP), are asking their consumers to sign a con-
tract with monthly payment, which may last one or several years. During the contract pe-
riod, the consumer must pay the service with an ex-ante speci￿c price, no matter whether
he/she consumes it or not. While this distribution method may not reduce the competition
between￿rms(FarrellandShapiro1989), itisstillverypopularintheserviceindustry. Two
aspects have been de￿ned as potential reasons for this popularity: one is that ￿rms may use
contracts to maintain their market share, deter potential entrants and reduce the uncertainty
of future pro￿ts; the second is that consumers will normally overestimate their future con-
sumption and purchase more than they really need (Vigna and Malmendier 2004).
Many service goods, such as TV subscription, internet access and mobile phone com-
munications, are homogenous and the utility that the consumers can obtain from these
goods will not increase simply by repeated purchase. Moreover, ￿rms in these industries
may not successfully lure the consumers who have signed a contract with other ￿rms by
cutting their prices. For example, if one of the consumers has already purchased one year
of unlimited internet access from an ISP, he/she will not obtain any more utility from pur-
chasing another internet access and obviously he/she will not consider purchasing more
internet access from another ISPs during that year, no matter how inexpensive it is.
Since consumers who are locked-in to their service providers with a contract may
be less likely to modify their choice or purchase more, ￿rms are actually competing in the
part of the market which constructed by two kinds of potential customers: those with a
strong willingness to buy, who can afford a relatively high price and have just ￿nished a
contract; and those with a weak willingness to purchase, who still stand outside the market
in a previous rounds competition and will not purchase the service unless the price is low
enough. Since some of the consumers with a high willingness to purchase are locked-in by
the contract, the chance for the ￿rms to meet a consumer who has very high willingness to
buyisrelativelylowerthanthechancethatthe￿rmswillmeetalowwillingnesstopurchase
95consumer. In other words, the density of the consumers who have a high willingness to
buy and just ￿nished a contract is lower than the density of the consumers who has low
willingness to buy and are outside the market. This difference affects the price sensitivity
of the total output.. To illustrate this further, we may think such an example: when the price
of the mobile phone is over 1000 USD, only 1 additional consumer will purchase it if the
￿rms reduce the price by 1 USD. However, because of the difference in density, when the
price is lower than 100 USD, 100 new consumers will join the market if the ￿rms reduce
the price by 1 USD. Here, the price of the mobile phone is more sensitive to the total output
when the price is high and when the total output is low. Firms may face a kinked demand
functions with different slope in different output level.
Compared with traditional linear demand function Cournot competition, the kinked
demand function may result in multiple equilibria. Firms may reach an equilibrium at
steeper part of the demand function, which means they only deal with high willingness
consumers and choose a relatively low output level. They may also reach an equilibrium
at ￿atter part of the demand function, which indicates they compete in an expanding mar-
ket. The existence of these equilibria and their location both depends on the initial market
structure. Our main focus is to locate the equilibrium outputs and reveal the relationship
between these equilibria and the initial market structure. Moreover, we will also investigate
the social welfare and ￿rms’ incentives in equilibrium selection and discuss its implications
to the social planner.
Some economic phenomenons as studied in the literature, have very similar charac-
teristics as a locked-in effect of contract, for example, consumer’s loyalty. The locked-in
consumers can be de￿ned as 100 percent loyal to the ￿rms with which they signed the con-
tract. Rosenthal (1980), Deneckere et al (1992), and Fisher and Wilson (1995) have studied
a single period model where part of the consumers only purchase from speci￿c ￿rms. The
difference between loyalty and locked-in by contract is that the ￿rm’s strategy will affect
loyal consumers’ behaviours and surplus but will not affect the consumers who are locked
by the contract. Although the loyal consumers will not purchase from other ￿rms, they can
choose to stand outside the market. If they choose to join the market, they need to pay
96the price in the current period. However, for the consumers who have signed a contract
with a speci￿c ￿rm, they must pay and only need to pay the goods at the previously ￿xed
price. This means ￿rms completely do not need to consider locked-in consumers when
they design their competition strategy. Some other similar cases are developed by Var-
ian (1980) and Padilla (1992), who investigated a model with part of the consumers who
cannot choose freely because they can only observe some speci￿c ￿rms’ price.
Ferrell and Klemperer (2006) point out that the previous cases (loyalty and imperfect
price information) can all be consolidated and analyzed or interpreted as a single period
model with switching cost. This concept was ￿rst discussed by Weizsacker (1984) and well
developed by Klemperer. In fact, the contract in our model can also be partly explained by
switching cost. Since the consumers locked-in by the contract will not choose other ￿rms’
product, we can say these consumers have an in￿nite switching cost with the choice of
service providers. However, switching cost model cannot fully characterize the locked-in
contract. This is because all the consumers in the switching cost model (similar to the
loyalty model) must face current market prices. In our model, the locked-in customer only
needs to pay an ex-ante speci￿ed price. Another development of our work compared with
the literature about switching costs is that we use an open market instead of a covered
market. In Klemperer’s earlier work (1987a, 1988, 1989), he uses a two period model to
investigate the effect of switching cost to the ￿rms’ behaviour. Since he assumes the ￿rms
follow Cournot or Bertrand competition in the ￿rst period, the market always shrink in the
second period compared with the total output of the ￿rst period. Thus, he does not need to
considerthepossibilitythatsomenewconsumers, whoneverpurchasefromany￿rmsinthe
￿rst period, may enter the market in the second period. Following this structure, most of the
literatures about the switching cost (Klemperer 1987b, 1995, Beggs and Klemperer1992)
choose to examine a more conveniently covered market or a linear city model. In this
chapter, we consider a single period competition with exogenous initial market structure,
which brings the potential possibility that the market may expand in the equilibrium (new
consumers entering the market) and multiple equilibria may exist in some circumstances.
97The development of an open market model may illustrate some new characteristics and
help to solve the market equilibrium for an arbitrary initial market condition.
Network externalities are another important feature of the information economy. In
a simple model without network effects, only the total number of the locked-in consumers
in the initial setting may in￿uence the equilibrium, while the component of these locked
customers is irrelevant. However, if we consider the network externalities, the initial mar-
ket structure will be every important in determination of the equilibrium. The ￿rm with
more locked-in consumers will inherently have an advantage in the competition, since their
product is more attractive to the consumers if all other conditions are equivalent. As an ex-
tension to the basic model, in the second part of this chapter, we provide a further study
of a locked-in model with network effect and asymmetric initial market structure. The
modelling of network externalities is based on the work of Katz and Shapiro (1985)
9.
Different to the basic model, the asymmetric initial market structure may result in an
asymmetric equilibrium. The ￿rms with more locked-in consumers are able to charge a
higher price and take a larger percentage of the market share. In some extreme cases, they
may even deter other ￿rms from entering the market. The size of the effect of initial advan-
tage is closely connected with the intensity of the network externalities. Strong network
externalities may enhance the effect of initial advantage, but weak network externalities
will make this advantage insigni￿cant. Moreover, pure strategy equilibrium will not al-
ways exist in the extended model. The number and location of the equilibrium vary with
the change of the initial market structure and the intensity of the network externalities. We
will solve all the equilibria and provide the suf￿cient and necessary conditions for their ex-
istence. The locked-in model with network externalities could be important when study the
￿rms’ merger behaviour in network economy. If the locked-in consumers from all merged
￿rms can be inherited by the new entity, obtaining more locked-in consumers could be an
incentive for the ￿rms to merge. This is because these locked-in consumers may bring a
relative advantage for the new entity in competition through the network effect.
9 More literatures about the network externalities can be found in the survey paper by Farrell and Klemperer
(2006).
98In Section 3.2, we will describe the basic model, solve for the equilibrium in the
duopoly and oligopoly market and give out a discussion about the social welfare in dif-
ferent equilibria. In Section 3.3, we add the network effect and asymmetric initial market
structure to our basic duopoly model, solve the equilibrium with different asymmetrical
levels and intensities of the network effect. We will also provide the suf￿cient and nec-
essary conditions for the existence of all the pure strategy equilibrium in extended model.
Section 3.4 is the conclusion and also recommends future work.
993.2 The Model with Locked-in
Assume there are only 2 ￿rms, A and B, in the market. They produce homogeneous prod-
ucts and compete with their outputs. Consumers are heterogeneous in their basic willing-
ness to pay for the product. We denote their basic willingness to pay for the product as r.
r varies across the consumers and is assumed to be uniformly distributed between minus
in￿nity and 1 with a density of one. The uniform distribution assumption allows us to ob-
tain a linear demand function for the products. This means that if we nominate a person,
who would like to pay the highest price to purchase the product, he/she has a willingness
that equals 1. And we assume people who dislike the product may have a willingness that
equals minus in￿nity. Our model is an opened market, so we do not need to discuss corner
solutions. These assumptions will make it convenient for us when we discuss the model
with network externalities in the second part of the chapter. We also assume the consumers
can only purchase one product from one of the ￿rms or stands outside the market. Obvi-
ously if both ￿rms want to have a positive output, they must set their prices to be equal,
because the products are homogeneous to the consumers. Thus, there is only one price in
the market and we denote it as p (1 > p > 0). When a consumer purchases the product
from one of the ￿rms, the surplus he can obtain is r ￿ p. We know that the consumer will
buy the product only if he/she can obtain a positive surplus from the purchase. Only those
consumers with their willingness (r) larger than p enter the market. Given the uniform dis-
tribution, the market size can be written as z (z = 1 ￿ p). Since p > 0, the market size, or
the total output of the ￿rms, z, is strictly less than 1.
3.2.1 Locked-in and Equilibrium in Duopoly Market
10Now we assume the number of the consumers who are already in the market before the
￿rms begin the competition is x0. As we know that if a consumer chooses to purchase the
product, any consumer with a willingness larger than him will also choose to purchase the
10 We only investigate pure strategy nash equilibrium in this chapter.. There may exist mixed strategy nash
equilibrium, but these strategies are not discussed here. However, they may be included in furture work.
100product, it is easy to see that these insiders in previous round competition are uniformly
distributed between 1￿x0 and 1. We also assume that half of the insiders in previous time
are locked-in with their service provider because of the purchasing contracts they signed.
This means half of the consumers who joined the market in previous time can neither
change their mind to choose another ￿rm’s product nor quit the market. Hence, when the
￿rms choose their outputs, they do not need to consider these locked-in consumers, because
their decisions will not change the behaviour of these customers. To make things easy,
we also assume that these consumers, who are locked in the market, are also uniformly
distributed. The density of the people, who are located and unlocked in [1 ￿ x0;1], is half
of the density of the people located from 1 ￿ x0 to minus in￿nity. The allocation of the
consumers and their willingness can be illustrated in the following ￿gure:
1 1-x0 0 r* r**
8
half density full density
Figure-3.1: Consumer’s willingness
From Figure-3.1 we can see that the consumers’ density in dashed area, [1 ￿ x0;1],
is just half of the density in solid line area, (￿1;1 ￿ x0].
We use xA and xB to denote the output of Firm A and B in current round competition
respectively. Here, xA and xB do not include the outputs for the consumers who are already
locked in the market. The ￿rms choose the output to maximize their pro￿ts and price p is
determined by the market. There exists a person who has no difference between purchasing
the product or not under price p. We denote this consumer’s willingness as r￿ if it is
located in [1 ￿ x0;1]. From Figure-3.1, we know r￿ is located in the dashed half density
area. According to our assumption, the people located in the right of the axes have more
incentive to get into the market than the ones located at relatively left. Thus, only the
consumers on the right side of r￿ purchase the product. In this situation, we have:







and the market size z =
x0
2 + 1￿r￿
2 , which is the sum of the consumers who voluntarily




x0, we know that some of the consumers who purchased produce previously choose to
stand outside the market in current round competition. In other words, the market shrinks
compared with the previous market size.
If the consumer, who has no difference between purchasing the product or not, is
located on the left side of 1 ￿ x0. we call his/her willingness r￿￿. From Figure-3.1, we can
see that r￿￿ is located in the full density area. For the same reason as above, we have :
xA + xB =
x0
2





and the market size z =
x0
2 + xA + xB = 1 ￿ r￿￿. In equation (3.2),
x0
2 represents the
consumers in the half density area, (1 ￿ x0) ￿ r￿￿ is the number of the consumers who
are located in [r￿￿;1 ￿ x0] with full density. By the de￿nition, r￿￿ < 1 ￿ x0, so we know
z = 1 ￿ r￿￿ > x0. This means, besides all the consumers who purchased the product in
previous time, some new consumers with a smaller r are enticed to enter the market. We
can also say that the market expanded compared with the previous market size.
The consumers who have been locked-in by their previous choices must buy the prod-
uct according to contract price they signed with the ￿rms in previous round competition.
These previous prices have no effect on the ￿rm’s decision right now, and all the prices we
discuss in this chapter are the prices that ￿rms set for the consumers who can freely choose
(the current market price). The consumers who haven’t been locked-in will enter the mar-
ket only if their willingness r is no less than p . Thus, the willingness of the consumer, who
have no difference between purchasing and not purchasing, must be p. If xA + xB 6
x0
2 ,
we denote the current market price as p￿ and we have r￿ = p￿. By rearranging the equation
(3.1), we can get:
p
￿ = 1 ￿ 2(xA + xB) (3.3)
102If xA + xB >
x0
2 , we denote the price as p￿￿ and we have r￿￿ = p￿￿. By rearranging the
equation (3.2), we will obtain:
p
￿￿ = 1 ￿
x0
2
￿ (xA + xB) (3.4)
Proposition 3.1 Firm A and B’s outputs are always less than 1 ￿
x0
2 when they
have a positive pro￿t.
Since the price has a negative relationship with the total output, Firm A and B will
always curb their output to maintain a positive price. Proposition 3.1 reveals the upper
limit of the ￿rm’s output. This proposition can easily be illustrated in Figure-3.1. From
Figure-3.1, we can see that if any ￿rm sets its output larger than 1 ￿
x0
2 , some consumers
located on the left side of 0 enter the market. This situation has been ruled out, because the
consumers located on the left side of 0 will not enter the market unless the price is negative.
Different to the traditional model with a linear single slop demand function, here, the
slop of demand function will change at different output levels. In order to provide more
intuition about the relationship between the ￿rm’s output and the market price, we combine
the equation (3.3) and (3.4) and draw the price function as the output of Firm A for a given
output of Firm B in the following ￿gure:













so xA is bounded by [0;1 ￿
x0
2 ￿ xB). From Proposition 3.1, we know 1 ￿
x0
2 ￿ xB > 0.
If xA 6
x0
2 ￿ xB, the market price will obey the function (3.3); if xA >
x0
2 ￿ xB, the price
function in the market is function (3.4). Function (3.3) and (3.4) joint at the kink point
Y (
x0
2 ￿ xB;1 ￿ x0). Obviously, with the change of the value of x0 and xB, kink point Y
will move upwards or downwards and the shape of the price function p￿ and p￿￿ will also
change. In an extreme case (
x0
2 < xB), the kink point Y will go to negative side. Hence,
p￿ part of the price function does not exist and the price is solely determined by p￿￿. The
intuition behind this situation is that the market size will surely expand if Firm B chooses
an output bigger than
x0
2 . Here, since x0 is less than 1, kink point Y (
x0
2 ￿ xB;1 ￿ x0) will
never locate below the xA axis. Thus, p￿￿ part of the price function always exists. This is
because Firm A can always choose an output to make the market expand if Firm B chooses
a relatively small output.
Figure-3.2 also reveals that the main difference between our model and the traditional
Cournot model is that the price function in our model is constructed by two straight lines
with different slopes, but in the traditional Cournot comptition, the price function has a
unique slope. From equation (3.3) and (3.4), we know that when xi 2 (
x0
2 ￿ x￿i;1 ￿
x0
2 ￿ x￿i), @p￿￿=@xi = 1 ; when xi 2 (0;
x0
2 ￿ x￿i], @p￿=@xi = 2. This means that if
the output increases by ￿x in the locked-in area, the demand (price) of the product will
reduce 2￿x. However, in the area that all the consumers can freely join the market, the
price will only decrease ￿x with an increase of ￿x in output. For convenience to denote,
we call the consumers who have purchased the product at previous round competition the
old consumers and the consumers who are outside the market in previous time the new
consumers. Combining Figure-3.1 and Figure-3.2, we may conclude that the price is more
sensitivetooutputifthetotaloutputhasnotreachedthelevelinwhichsomenewconsumers
join the market. In addition, the ￿rms have less incentive to increase their output when their
output are relatively low. This is because the price will decrease very quickly when they
increase by a relatively small amount of output. However, if the output has reached a
threshold, the price will be less sensitive to the output and the ￿rms have more incentive
104to increase their output. This demand structure provides the possibility of the existence of
multiple equilibria.
Firm A will choose an output, xA, from [0;1 ￿
x0
2 ￿ xB) to maximize its pro￿t ￿A.
If xA is chosen from (0;
x0





￿ = xA(1 ￿ 2(xA + xB)) (3.5)











A reaches its maximum:
￿
￿








Here, we need to be cautious that we don’t know whether ￿￿
A max can be reached or not.
This is because we don’t know whether x￿
A is located in (0;
x0
2 ￿xB] or not without knowing
the value of xB.




2 ￿xB), we denote the pro￿t of





￿￿ = xA[1 ￿
x0
2
￿ (xA + xB)] (3.8)
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￿￿












A max can only be reached when x￿￿
A 2 [
x0






what output Firm A chooses, while Firm A knows only p￿￿ part of the price function exists.
In this situation, Firm A will always choose x￿￿
A as its best respondence to Firm B’s output.
With the condition xB >
x0
2 and Proposition 3.1, we can get
x0





A max can always be reached.
105If xB <
x0
2 , for a given xB, whether the market expands or shrinks will depend on
Firm A’s behaviour. So Firm A will choose its strategy by comparing the maximum pro￿t
it can obtain when market expands with the maximum pro￿t it can obtain when market
shrinks. Now we draw ￿￿
A and ￿￿￿




Figure-3.3: The pro￿t function of Firm A given Firm B’s output.




4 > 0, so x￿￿
A is
always on the left side of x￿






2 ￿ xB > x￿￿
A > x￿
A > 0. This means x￿￿
A and x￿






2 ￿ xB, we get Figure-3.3-a. It is easy to see ￿￿
A max cannot be
reached in Figure-3.3-a and ￿￿
A is maximized when xA =
x0
2 ￿ xB. However, ￿￿￿
A max can
be reached and we have ￿￿
A(xA =
x0
2 ￿ xB) = ￿￿￿
A (xA =
x0
2 ￿ xB) < ￿￿￿
A max. From
equation (3.6) and x￿
A >
x0
2 ￿ xB, we obtain that the condition to enter the situation in
106Figure-3.3-a is xB > x0￿ 1




Firm A will choose x￿￿
A as its best response and maximize its pro￿t at ￿￿￿
A max. As we
have discussed previously, when xB >
x0
2 , Firm A will always choose x￿￿
A as its output.








2 ￿ xB > x￿￿
A > x￿
A, we obtain Figure-3.3-b. In this situation, ￿￿￿
A max cannot
be reached. ￿￿￿
A is maximized when xA =
x0
2 ￿ xB. But ￿￿




2 ￿ xB) = ￿￿
A(xA =
x0
2 ￿ xB) < ￿￿
A max. From equation (3.9)
and
x0
2 ￿ xB > x￿￿
A , we obtain that the condition to enter the situation in Figure-3.3-b is
xB 6 3
2x0 ￿ 1. Figure-3.3-b tells us, for a given xB 2 [0;
3x0
2 ￿ 1], Firm A will choose x￿
A





2 ￿ xB > x￿
A, we obtain Figure-3.3-c. Here, ￿￿
A max and ￿￿￿
A max can
both be reached, so whether Firm A choose x￿
A or x￿￿
A as its best output depends on which
maximum pro￿t is larger. From (3.7) and (3.10):
￿
￿￿
A max > ￿
￿









Inequality (3.11) tells us, if ￿￿
A max and ￿￿￿
A max can all be reached, Firm A’s best response
is x￿￿






2 ; Firm A’s best response is x￿







and Firm A’s best response can be either x￿￿
A or x￿






2 , since both of
which yield the same maximum pro￿t.
If we put all three situations together, it is easy for us to obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.2 For a given x￿i 2 [0;1 ￿
x0






















(i = A or B)
The intuition behind Proposition 3.2 is: when one of the competitors sets his output
very large (larger than
x0
2 ), the market will surely expand. Then, its opponent has to follow
the expanding strategy (x￿￿
i ) and choose a relatively large output to maximize its pro￿t.
107However, when one of the competitors sets its output at a level, which is not large enough
to surely make the market expand, its opponent will have two choices: one is to set an
output to make the market expand; the other is to let the market shrink. Which one is
the best choice depends upon how large the ￿rst competitor sets its output. If the ￿rst
competitor’s output is relatively small, its opponent will also set a relatively small output
to make the market shrink. If the ￿rst competitor chooses an aggressive strategy to make a
relatively large output, making the market expand will be a better choice for its opponent.





















By solving equations (3.12) and (3.13), we can get xA = xB = 1
3 ￿
x0
6 . The equilibrium



















By solving equations (3.14) and (3.15), we can obtain xA = xB = 1
6. This means the
equilibrium occurs if both of the ￿rms set their output equal to 1
6.
If one of the ￿rms follows the expanding market strategy and the other one chooses
the shrinking market strategy, there will be no equilibrium. This can be illustrated by
the fact that there is no solution if we substitute (3.12) to (3.15) or substitute (3.13) to
(3.14). The reason behind this is straightforward. After the ￿rms determine their outputs,
the market must either expand or shrink. If the market expands, the ￿rm who follows the
shrinking strategy can simply change to choose expanding strategy to increase its pro￿t; if
the market shrinks, the ￿rm who chooses expanding strategy will change it mind in order
to obtain more pro￿ts. By the de￿nition of equilibrium, there does not exist an equilibrium
in which two ￿rms choose different strategies.
108Proposition 3.3 For a given x0 2 (0; 5￿2
p
2
3 ), the market will expand and there exists




If x0 2 (5￿3
p
2;1), the market will shrink and there exists unique symmetric equilibrium
in which both of the ￿rms set their output at 1
6. If x0 2 [5￿2
p
2
3 ;5 ￿ 3
p
2], there exists two
symmetric equilibria: (xA = xB = 1
3 ￿
x0
6 ) and (xA = xB = 1
6).
To illustrate Proposition 3.3, we can draw the reaction function of Firm A and B in
the following ￿gure:
K
O J Reaction function of firm A





Figure-3.4: Reaction function and equilibria.
In Figure-3.4, the solid lines are the reaction functions of Firm A and B. We can
see the reaction functions of both ￿rms are constructed by two parallel lines. When xB is
small, Firm A follows the lower one and when xB becomes large, Firm A jumps to follow







O and J are the crossing points of the two reaction functions and they are also equilibrium
points. Since K is determined by x0, point K will move along the xB axis when the value
ofx0 changes. Whenx0 isrelativelysmall, K willmovetotheleftsideofpointO (K < 1
6).
In this situation, the lower part of the reaction function of Firm A and B will be too short to
cross. Thus, the two reaction functions only cross at one point, J. This means only unique
equilibrium exists and both of the ￿rms follow the expanding strategy.




this situation, the higher part of the two reaction functions will be too short to cross. The
reaction function of Firm A and B will only cross at point O. This means the market only
has a unique equilibrium and both of the ￿rms follow the shrinking strategy.
For some x0, K will locate between O and J (1
3 ￿
x0
6 > K > 1
6). In this situation,
the reaction function of Firm A and B will cross at two point and multiple equilibria exist.
Proposition 3.3 tell us that the initial market status (how many consumers are locked-
in) directly determines the location of the equilibrium. If only a few top-end consumers
are locked, ￿rms will prefer to choose to explore new markets and entice new consumers
to join the market. However, if most of the consumers with positive willingness to pay
have already been locked, ￿rms prefer to choose the shrinking strategy. This is because
consumers in the new market have a low willingness to buy and ￿rms must reduce the price
toa suf￿cientlylowlevel toattractthem. Iftheprice isgreatlyreduced, ￿rmswilllosemore
pro￿ts from those consumers with high willingness. This explains that why ￿rms prefer to
reduce their outputs and increase the price to squeeze pro￿ts from those high willingness
customers rather than explore new market.
3.2.1 Social Welfare in Equilibrium
We de￿ne the social welfare as the sum of the consumers’ surplus plus the pro￿ts of the
￿rms. Here, we do not consider the welfare of the consumers who are locked-in the market
by previous contracts, since the behaviour of the ￿rms in the current period has no effect to
their welfare and will not change the pro￿ts squeezed from them. For a type r consumer,
his/her surplus equals r￿p if he/she chooses to purchase the product and his/her surplus is
zero if he/she stands outside the market. The total surplus of the consumers is the integra-
tion over all the new consumers with their willingness from 1 to r￿ in a shrinking market
or from 1 to r￿￿ in an expanding market.
For the equilibrium in the expanding market, we de￿ne the number of the consumers






























In equation (3.16), z￿￿ decreases with an increase of x0. However, in the expanding market,
the number of the consumers in half density area is
x0
2 which increases with an increase of
x0. This indicates that the number of new consumers in the full density area (outside
locked-in area) will decrease very fast with an increase of x0. This is illustrated in equation
(3.17) in which the coef￿cient of x0 is ￿5
6. We can substitute the expanding market outputs










We denote the consumers’ surplus in the expanding market as S￿￿. By integrating the





































We use ￿￿￿ to denote the ￿rms’ total pro￿ts in the expanding market. By multiplying (3.17)












































For the equilibrium in the shrinking market, only the consumers in the locked-in area
(half density area) join the market. The number of the new consumers in this situation
are easy to calculate by adding the shrinking equilibrium outputs of Firm A and ￿rm B
together. If we use z￿ to denote the total outputs in shrinking market, z￿ = 2x￿
i = 1
3. From
111equation (3.3), we can obtain r￿ = p￿ = 1














The ￿rms’ total pro￿t is ￿￿ = z￿p￿ = 1
9 and the social welfare is W ￿ = S￿ + ￿￿ = 2
9.
Proposition 3.4 In the expanding equilibrium, consumer’s surplus and the total
social welfare increases with an increase of the initial locked-in consumers, but the total
pro￿t of the ￿rms decreases with an increase of the initial locked-in consumers. In a shrink-
ing equilibrium, consumer’s surplus, total social welfare and the total pro￿ts of the ￿rms
are all constant.
In expanding equilibrium, from (3.17) and (3.18), the total output and the market
price will both decrease with an increase of the initial locked-in consumers, so the total
pro￿t of all the ￿rms must have a negative relationship with x0. However, from Proposition
3.4, we know that the social welfare has a positive relationship with x0. This is because the
consumers’ surplus increases faster than the decrease in the ￿rm’s pro￿t, so, in aggregate,
the total welfare of the expanding equilibrium increases with an increase in x0. In the
shrinking equilibrium, only the consumers in the half density area will join into the market,
so the ￿rms actually compete in a traditional Cournot model with half density demand.
From Proposition 3.3, we know the ￿rms will always choose their outputs as 1
6, so the
location of the equilibrium and the total welfare will not change with the change of the
initial setting.
Proposition 3.5 If multiple equilibria exist, the social welfare in the expanding
equilibrium is always larger than the social welfare in the shrinking equilibrium. However,
the ￿rms obtain fewer pro￿ts in the expanding equilibrium than the shrinking equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5 tells us the ￿rms’ incentives always contradicts with the social plan-
ner’s incentive if there exists two equilibria. The ￿rms always want to go to the equilibrium
with the smaller output and make the market shrink. However, the social planner prefers
112that the ￿rms compete at the larger output equilibrium (expanding equilibrium). The im-
plication for the social planner is: if x0 results in two possible equilibria and there are no
regulations for the competition, the ￿nal equilibrium may locate at the one with less social
welfare. Sometimes, ￿rms will even set up self-regulations or collude in the competition
to make sure they reach the shrinking equilibrium since this equilibrium bene￿ts both of
them. If the social planners want to maximize the social welfare, they should set up some
mechanism to urge the ￿rms to produce more and reach the equilibrium which makes the
market expand.
3.2.1 Locked-in Competition in Oligopoly Market
The duopoly model can be easily extended to an oligopoly market. The competition analy-
sis is very similar to the duopoly case. The only difference is that ￿rms consider their
opponent as the total output of all other ￿rms when they choose their competition strategy.
Assuming there are n ￿rms in the market, we de￿ne these ￿rms are Firm i and their outputs
as xi (i = 1;2::n). Other notations have the same meaning as previous section. Following
a similar procedure, we can obtain Firm i’s reaction function to the total output of all other











xj i;j 2 f1;:::;ng (3.22)














xj i;j 2 f1;:::;ng (3.23)
Comparing equation (3.22) and (3.23) with equation (3.6) and (3.9), we can see the only
difference between these equations is that
P
xj substitutes xB, since every ￿rm makes
its decision by considering the aggregate output of all other competitors. According to

















2 , ￿rm i’s best response is equation (3.23) (j 6= i and i;j 2 f1;:::;ng).
113Since the market will either expand or shrink at the end of the period, the ￿rms who
choose to follow the shrinking strategy (x￿
i) will always want to change their mind if the
market ￿nally expands and the ￿rms who choose to follow the expanding strategy (x￿￿
i ) will
change their minds if they ￿nd the market ￿nally shrinks. By the de￿nition of equilibrium,
all the ￿rms must choose the same strategy in equilibrium, so they will either all choose
(3.22) or all choose (3.23).
If all the ￿rms choose shrinking strategy, by solving the equation (3.22)
11, we can
obtain the symmetric shrinking equilibrium output as 1
2(n+1). If all the ￿rms choose the
expanding strategy, by solving the equation (3.23), we can get the symmetric expanding
equilibrium output as 1
n+1 ￿
x0
2(n+1). Following the proof of Proposition 3.3, we can obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 3.6 When x0 > 1￿ 2
p
2￿2
n+1 , there always exists a shrinking equilibrium in
which all ￿rms symmetrically set their output as 1











For convenience to denote, we de￿ne:















￿2 ￿ ￿1 =
2(
p
2 ￿ 1)(n ￿ 1)






Since n > 1, ￿2 ￿ ￿1 > 0, and ￿2 is always in the left side of ￿1. From equation (3.24) and
(3.25), it is easy to ￿nd that both ￿1 and ￿2 are located between 0 and 1 for any n in our
de￿nition. In order to get a more understanding about Proposition 3.6, we draw ￿1 and ￿2
in the following ￿gure:
11 Since all the ￿rms are symmetric at the equilibrium, equation (3.22) can be rewritten as x = 1=4 ￿
1=2(n ￿ 1)x. Thus, we can obtain the equilibrium output by solving this equation. A similar method can be
used to solve the expanding equilibrium with equation (3.23).
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Figure-3.5: Location of ￿1 and ￿2
According to Proposition 3.6 and Figure-3.5, there exists a unique equilibrium when
x0 is located between 0 and ￿1 or between ￿2 and 1. When x0 is relatively small (x0 < ￿1),
the ￿rms will all follow an expanding strategy and reach a unique expanding equilibrium.
When x0 is relatively large (x0 < ￿2), the ￿rms will all choose a shrinking strategy and the
unique equilibrium is the shrinking equilibrium. When x0 is located between ￿1 and ￿2,
two equilibria exist. In this situation, we cannot determine which equilibrium will actually
be played without more information. If we set n = 2, these conclusions coincide with
Proposition 3.3.
From equation (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26), we know lim(￿1) = lim(￿2) = 1 and
lim(￿2 ￿ ￿1) = 0 if n ￿! 1. This means ￿1 and ￿2 both move towards 1 when the
number of the ￿rms in the market increases. However, with the increase of n, ￿1 moves
more quickly than ￿2, so the gap between ￿1 and ￿2 decreases. When n is very large (per-
fect competition market), both ￿1 and ￿2 will be very close to 1 and the gap between them
will be very small. The implication here is, with the increase of n, the chance of exist-
ing shrinking equilibrium decreases. This is because the intensity of competition increases
with an increase in the number of the ￿rms in the market. Thus, the chance for the ￿rms to
squeeze more pro￿ts from consumers by using the method of cutting outputs will decrease
when n becomes larger. The ￿rms will be more willing to choose an expanding strategy in
market with relatively large n. When n goes to in￿nity, the market is under perfect com-
petition. Thus, there is no chance for the ￿rms to reach a shrinking equilibrium and the
market output will be ￿xed at 1.
1153.3 The Model with Locked-in and Network Externalities
In the previous model, the ￿rms are perfectly symmetric. They produce homogeneous
products and face an identical price function. We also have proven that only symmetric
equilibrium exists in this situation. However, the ￿rms may compete based on asymmetric
initial market conditions. In the model we discussed previously, the ￿rm’s market shares at
previous round competition will not affect the competition in the current period. However,
this is only correct in a world without network externalities. If the ￿rms produce network
products, their previous market status may bene￿t or harm their competition in the cur-
rent period through the locked-in effect. The ￿rm with a larger market share in previous
time will have more locked-in consumers in the current period and these locked-in con-
sumers will guarantee a larger network size. Hence, the ￿rm, which has larger market size
previously, is more attractive to the consumers who can freely choose the product in cur-
rent period. In other words, the ￿rm with larger output in the previous period will have an
inherent advantage. In this section, we make a modi￿cation to our model in Section 3.2
by adding the network externalities and an asymmetric initial market structure. We want to
￿nd how much the asymmetric market status will affect the equilibrium output in a network
world.
We consider a duopoly market with Firm A and B competing with their outputs. If
the products have a network effect, the ￿nal surplus, which a consumer can obtain after
he/she chooses to join the market, will not only depend on the price of the product but
also on how many consumers make the same choice. We assume the two ￿rms produce
completely incompatible products and the network externalities a consumer can obtain are
u(Xi)
12 when he/she purchases Firm i’s product (i = A or B). Here, Xi is the sum of
the number of the consumers who choose Firm i’s product in current period (xi) and the
number of the consumers who are locked-in by Firm i. Now, we assume ￿rm A and B have
x0
A and x0
B consumers in the previous time (x0
A > 0;x0
B > 0) and Firm A has a competitive
advantage (x0
A > x0
B). Similar to previous model, we assume half of x0
i are locked-in with
12 According to the generally accepted characteristics of the network utility function, we assume u(x) > 0,
u0(x) > 0, u00(x) 6 0.
116their previous service provider. These locked-in consumers are uniformly distributed. If
the consumer chooses Firm A’s product, the network externalities he/she can obtain from




13. The surplus that a consumer with willingness r can obtain
when he/she chooses Firm A’s product, is r + u(
x0
A
2 + xA) ￿ pA. Here, if both of the ￿rms









+ xB) ￿ pB (3.27)
This is because the surplus a consumer can obtain from purchasing Firm A or Firm B’s
product must have no difference, otherwise all the consumers will choose to buy just from
one ￿rm. From equation (3.27), we can conclude that the ￿rms may have different prices if
they provide different network externalities. The larger network the ￿rm can provide, the
higher price he can charge to the consumers. If the ￿rm has a relatively small network, it
has to reduce the price to attract the consumers to choose its product.











For the consumer, who have no difference of whether to join the market or not, we have:





Here, theconsumerwithanegativewillingnesscanalsojointhemarketwhenpi < u(x0
i=2+
xi). Unlike the model without network externalities, the market size is not bounded by 1
anymore.
3.3.1 Linear Network Externalities and the Behaviour of the Firms
We assume, for both products, these is a linear network utility function: u(x) = bx (0 <
b < bmax)
14. We also assume that x0
A + x0
B is bound by 1 (x0
A + x0
B < 1). Similar to the
13 Actually, the consumer’s choice depends on the expectation of the output of the ￿rms, since they cannot
know the exact output of the ￿rms prior to making their decision. In this model, we assume the expected
output of the ￿rms perfectly changes with the real output of the ￿rms and the expected output can always be
reached. As a result, the ￿rm’s output and the consumer’s expectation have no difference.
14 In fact, b can be any positive number. However, we limite our discussion to a relatively small network
117previous model, we can obtain the price function of Firm A with a given output of ￿rm B,
x0
A and x0
B. If the consumer, who has no difference of whether to join the market or not, has
a willingness, r, that locates in (1￿(x0
A +x0
B);1), the market will shrink. In this situation,
we denote this critical consumer’s willingness as r￿. According to Figure-3.1 and equation
(3.28), we now have:

















￿ (2 ￿ b)xA ￿ 2xB (3.29)
If the consumer, who has no difference of whether to join the market or not, has a willing-
ness, r, that locate in (￿1;1￿(x0
A+x0
B)), the market will expand. We then denote his/her
willingness as r￿￿. From Figure-3.1 and equation (3.28), we have:






















￿ (1 ￿ b)xA ￿ xB (3.30)
If the critical willingness r = 1￿(x0
A+x0
B), the market will maintain its previous size and
equation (3.29) and (3.30) will be identical.
We temporarily treat xB, x0
A and x0
B as exogenous variables. The price of Firm A’s
product isdetermined by p￿




2 ￿xB and by p￿￿





obtain a clearer picture of the price function of Firm A, We will illustrate it in the following
￿gure:
externality by setting b is strictly less than bmax. (bmax ￿ 0:457). bmax is largest b which allows the point
K in Figure-3.7 less than 1. This assumption maintains a majority characteristics of the network effect and










Figure-3.6: Price function of Firm A given xB, x0
A and x0
B
From Figure-3.6, the slope of the price function of Firm A in a shrinking market is
@p￿
A=@xA = ￿2 + b. Since 0 < b < 1
2, @p￿
A=@xA is located in (￿2;￿1). In the expanding
market, the slope of ￿rm A’s the price function is @p￿￿
A =@xA = ￿1 + b > ￿1. Comparing
Figure-3.6 with Figure-3.2, we can ￿nd the price function p￿
A and p￿￿
A are both ￿ater in the
network world and Figure-3.6 can be seen as a graph constructed by pulling every point of
the price function in Figure-3.2 to the left side. The force to pull the price functions can be
explained by the network externalities. This is because, for a given price, more consumers
are willing to join the market if the ￿rms produce network products and consumers’ surplus
is larger in the network model than in the model without network externalities. For a
concave network utility function, network externalities may force the price function to be
concave. But, with a linear network utility assumption, the price functions will maintain
linear.
In Figure-3.6, Y is the joint point of two price functions. At point Y , ￿rms keep the























2 ￿xB 6 0, point Y goes to the negative side of the xA axis and the price
function is dominated by p￿￿
A . This means that Firm B has chosen a relatively large output,
hence the market will expand no matter what Firm A
’s strategy is. In this situation, Firm A
119has to follow the expanding strategy. From equation (3.31) and x0
A+x0
B < 1, we know that




2 ￿xB > 0. This means, when p￿
A exists,
point Y will never go downward to the negative side of the pA axis and the price function
will never be dominated by p￿
A.















By our de￿nition, ￿A and ￿B are larger than 1 and ￿ < 1
2.
If xB > ￿ and the price function is dominated by p￿￿
A , both of the ￿rms will follow the
expanding strategy and the market will reach the expanding equilibrium. Now, we consider
the circumstances that xB < ￿ and Firm A faces a kinked price function. In this situation,
if xA 6 ￿ ￿ xB, the market price is determined by p￿





A = xA[￿A ￿ (2 ￿ b)xA ￿ 2xB] (3.33)
From the ￿rst order condition, ￿￿














If xA > ￿ ￿ xB, the market price is determined by p￿￿





A = xA[￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ b)xA ￿ xB] (3.36)
From the ￿rst order condition, ￿￿￿











(￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ xB)2
4(1 ￿ b)
(3.38)
Here, we must be cautious that ￿￿￿
A max and ￿￿
A max can only be reached when x￿
A and x￿￿
A
are located in their de￿nition area.
120Proposition 3.7 When ￿i > (2 ￿ b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿, Firm i will always
choose function x￿￿
i as its best response for a given output of Firm ￿i. When ￿i < (2 ￿
b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿, if x￿i 6 ￿i, Firm i will choose x￿
i as its best response; and if
x￿i > ￿i, Firm i will choose x￿￿
i as its best response. (￿i = ￿ +
2￿￿￿i p
(1￿b)(2￿b)￿b, i = A or
B)





B = 1 and ￿i = (2 ￿ b +
p




















Figure-3.7: The allocation of x0
A and x0
B
In Figure-3.7, the line KJ is the function ￿A = (2 ￿ b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿ and the
line kj is the function ￿B = (2 ￿ b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿. By assuming x0
B = 0, we can





2(1 ￿ b) +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b)
(3.39)
In a similar way, by assuming x0





2 ￿ b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b)
(3.40)
Comparing (3.39) and (3.40), we ￿nd that K is always located above k. When x0
A = x0
B,
￿A equals ￿B, so line KJ and kj cross at a point located on line x0
A = x0





B < 1, x0
A and x0





B = 1 and x0
A axis. This triangular area is divided by
121KJ and kj into three parts. We de￿ne these parts as the F1, F2 and F3 area according to
Figure-3.7.
From Proposition 3.7, we know Firm A will always choose the expanding strategy
if x0
A and x0
B are located below line KJ and Firm B will always choose the expanding
strategy if x0
A and x0
B are located below line kj. Thus, in F3, both ￿rms will choose a
reaction function which makes the market expand, because x0
A and x0
B are very small in
this area. When x0
A and x0
B are located above line KJ, Firm A will choose x￿
A as its best
response if xB 6 ￿A and choose x￿￿
A as its best response if xB > ￿A. Similarly, when x0
A
and x0
B are located above line kj, Firm B will choose x￿
B as its best response if xA 6 ￿B
and choose x￿￿
B as its best response if xA > ￿B. Since all the points in the F1 area are
located above KJ and kj, Firm A and B will all choose a piecewise function as their
reaction function when x0
A and x0
B belongs to F1. For any points belonging to the F2 area,
Firm B will choose a piecewise function as its reaction function and Firm A will always
follow an expanding strategy.
The network externalities will affect the structure of Figure-3.7 and the size of F1,
F2 and F3. For any b in our de￿nition area, we have @x0
A(K)=@b > 0 and @x0
A(k)=@b > 0.
From (3.39) and (3.40), we can ￿nd that x0
A(K) = x0
A(k) = 2 ￿
p
2 when b = 0. This
tells us that if b or the intensity of network effect decrease, point K goes down and point
k goes down as well. Hence, F1 area will increase. However, the speed for K to go
down is much quicker than that for point k. When b = 0, k will be caught up by K and
the F2 area will disappear. This coincides with the model without network externalities
in previous sections: KJ and kj become the same line and both have a slope equal to 1.
When b increases, points K , k , J and j will all go up or go right, the F1 area will become
smaller and the F3 area will become larger. This is because the increasing in the network
externalities causes Firm A and B more prefer to use the expanding strategy and they might
to choose the expanding strategy even if the initial market locked-in size is relatively large.
1223.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
Any pair of x0
A and x0
B in our de￿nition must be located in the F1, F2 or F3 area, so we
separate our discussion of the equilibrium into three cases. There is a proposition which
can be applied to all three cases:
Proposition 3.8 Firm A’s expanding reaction function (x￿￿
A ) will never cross with
Firm B’s shrinking reaction function (x￿
B); and Firm A’s shrinking reaction function (x￿￿
A )
will nevercross with Firm B’s expandingreaction function (x￿￿
B ) ineach reaction function’s
de￿nition area.
Proposition 3.8 indicates that there does not exist an equilibrium in which Firm A
chooses the expanding strategy but Firm B chooses the shrinking strategy or Firm A
chooses the shrinking strategy but Firm B chooses the expanding strategy. The reason
behind this proposition is that only one status exists for the ￿nal market. Every ￿rm will
change its mind if the wrong reaction function according to the ￿nal market situation has
been chosen. By the de￿nition of the equilibrium, there does not exist an equilibrium in
which two ￿rms follow different strategies.
x0
A and x0
B in F3 and F2 area
If x0
A and x0
B are located in the F3 area, Firm A and B will both choose expand-
ing strategy. Equation (3.37) is the reaction function of Firm A in the expanding market.




￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ xA
2(1 ￿ b)
(3.41)
We draw (3.37) and (3.41) in the following ￿gure:
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Reaction of firm B
Reaction of firmA
(b)
Figure-3.8: The reaction functions when x0
A , x0
B are located in F3
Since x0
A > x0
B, we have ￿A > ￿B and W > R > T. If R > S, we will get Figure-
3.8-a and the equilibrium will occur at point O. Combining (3.37) and (3.41), we can solve
this equilibrium:
xA =
2(1 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
;xB =
2(1 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
(3.42)
If R 6 S, we will get Figure-3.8-b and the equilibrium will occur at point S. By solving




;xB = 0 (3.43)
If x0
A and x0
B are located in the F2 area, Firm A will always follow the expanding
strategy, but Firm B will consider a piecewise reaction function. This case is very similar to
the situation in which x0
A and x0
B are located in the F3 area. We can make a small revision





Reaction of firm B











Reaction of firm B
Reaction of firmA
(b)
Figure-3.9: The reaction functions when x0
A , x0
B are located in F2




B (xA = ￿B) > x￿
B(xA = ￿B) and we also know T is always on the left side
of t
15. Hence, x￿
B is always on the left side of the RT line. If R 6 S, we will obtain
Figure-3.9-b and the equilibrium occurs at point S. This equilibrium is (3.43), which is
the same as Figure-3.8-b. If R > S, we obtain Figure-3.9-a. In this case, whether there
exists a pure strategy equilibrium depends on the position of ￿B. When ￿B is small, the
equilibrium is point O and the equilibrium output of the ￿rms is given out by (3.42). When
￿B goes large, the reaction function of Firm A (x￿￿
A ) may just cross the gap between x￿￿
B
and x￿
B. There will be no crossing point between the two ￿rm’s reaction functions. Or, we
can say there is no pure strategy equilibrium. However, ￿B is determined by x0
A and x0
B,
which are chosen from F3, so ￿B can only vary in a limited area. In fact, ￿B may not
go above point O if x0
A, x0
B and b are chosen from our de￿nition area
16. This means that
the reaction function of Firm A and B will always intersect and there always exists a pure
strategy equilibrium, no matter whether x0
A and x0
B are located in F2 or F3 area. We can
15 We can obtain the reaction function of Firm B from (3.41) and (3.44). By setting xB = 0, we can obtain
T and t and







￿B ￿ 2￿ + b￿
2(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)
Since ￿B > 2￿, T ￿ t > 0 () T > t.
16 The proof can be seen at the proof of Proposition 3.9.
125combine the equilibrium analysis when x0
A and x0
B are located in F3 and F2 together and
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3.9 When x0
A and x0
B are located in the F2 and F3 area, there
always exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If x0
A > ￿, the equilibrium is:
(xA =
￿A￿￿
2(1￿b), xB = 0) and if x0








Proposition 3.10 If b > b￿, there exists a pair of x0
A and x0
B, which are located
in the F3 or F2 area and leads the market to the equilibrium (xA =
￿A￿￿
2(1￿b);xB = 0). If
b < b￿, the equilibrium (xA =
￿A￿￿
2(1￿b);xB = 0) does not exist for any given pair of x0
A
and x0
B, which are located in F3 or F2 area. (Here b￿ ￿ 0:361 and is the solution of
12b3 ￿ 12b2 + 1 = 0)
To obtain more intuition about Proposition 3.9 and 3.10, we can draw x0
A = ￿ in


















From Proposition 3.9, we know the market will reach equilibrium (3.43) when x0
A
and x0
B are located above x0
A = ￿ and the market will go to equilibrium (3.42) when x0
A
and x0
B are located below x0




2￿5b+2b2 and L is given in A3.8. It is easy to test, for any b 2 (0;bmax), E ￿ L > 0.
126exists a pair of x0
A and x0
B in the F3 or F2 area, which is located above x0
A = ￿ if and
only if D < K. The location of point D depends on b. When b is relatively small, D is
very large and located above K. When b increase, point D will go down. From Proposition
3.10, we know that when b = b￿, D equals K. Since b￿ < bmax, these exists a b, which is
in out de￿nition area and larger than b￿. When b > b￿, D is located below K and any pair
of x0
A and x0
B located in F2￿ area (F2￿ ￿ F2) will lead the market to equilibrium (3.43).
The implication of Proposition 3.9 illustrates that there exists a situation that Firm B
cannot obtain any new consumers because Firm A has an extremely large initial number of
locked-in consumers. In this case, the difference in initial locked-in consumers is so large
that any positive price offered by Firm B will not attract consumers to join its network.
Thus, Firm B has to just produce for their previous locked-in consumers. In Figure-3.10,
any point located in F2￿ satis￿es this condition. We can see these points in F2￿ all have a
large x0
A and relatively small x0
B. However, Proposition 3.10 also tells us that only a rela-
tively large difference in initial number of locked-in consumers is not enough for one ￿rm
to deter another. The Firm with an advantage needs network externalities as a catalyst to
enable its advantage in the initial market structure to become the advantage in the competi-
tion. The ￿rm with a larger number of locked-in consumers can always bene￿t more from
network externalities and obtain certain advantages, while larger network effect will make
this advantage more signi￿cant. More speci￿cally, if Firm A wants to drive Firm B out of
the market, the intensity of network effect must reach a critical level. To the social planner,
larger network externalities increases the chance that the market becomes a monopoly by
increasing the size of F2￿ area.
x0
A and x0
B are located in the F1 area
If x0
A and x0
B are located in the F1 area, both Firm A and Firm B will choose a
piecewise function as their reaction function.
Proposition 3.11 If x0
A and x0
B are located in F1 area, there does not exist an
equilibrium in which Firm A have a positive output and Firm B have zero output.
127From the proof of Proposition 3.8, we know that function x￿
A and x￿
B are located
below the line x0
A + x0
B = ￿ and x￿￿
A and x￿￿
B are located above the line x0
A + x0
B = ￿. If
Firm A wants to deter Firm B from getting new consumers, x￿￿
B must locate under function
x￿
A
18. However, this is impossible, since x￿￿
i is always located above x￿
i.
According to Proposition 3.8, only two possible equilibria exist. One is located at the
intersection of functions x￿
A and x￿
B and we de￿ne this equilibrium as a shrinking equilib-
rium with outputs (xS
A; xS
B). The other is located at the intersection of functions x￿￿
A and
x￿￿
B and we de￿ne this equilibrium as an expanding equilibrium with outputs (xE
A; xE
B).
Assume both of the ￿rms choose the shrinking strategy. By solving x￿
A and x￿
B, we




(2 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B





(2 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
(3.45)
The suf￿cient and necessary condition of the existence of the shrinking equilibrium is that
the intersection of the two shrinking strategy functions is located in the de￿nition area. This
equals the conditions that xS
A 6 ￿B and xS
B 6 ￿A.
In the same way, by solving x￿￿
A and x￿￿





2(1 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿





2(1 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
(3.47)
The suf￿cient and necessary condition of the existence of the expanding equilibrium is
that the intersection of x￿￿
A and x￿￿
B is located in the de￿nition area, which equals to the
condition that xE
A > ￿B and xE
B > ￿A. Combining these conditions together, we can
obtain the following proposition:
18 The illustration of this can be found in Figure-3.14 in Appendix.
128Proposition 3.12 For a given x0
A and x0
B located in the F1 area, if xS
B 6 ￿A and
xE
B < ￿A, there exists only one shrinking equilibrium (xS
A;xS
B); if xS
B 6 ￿A and xE
B > ￿A,





B > ￿A and xE
B > ￿A, there exists
only one expanding equilibrium (xE
A;xE
B); if xS
B > ￿A and xE
B < ￿A, no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium exists.

















































































Figure-3.11: The equilibrium analysis when x0
A and x0
B are located in the F1 area.
In Figure-3.11, K1Q1 is the function xE
B = ￿A and K2Q2 is the function xS
B = ￿A.
From Proposition 3.12, we know that the expending equilibrium will exist if and only if
(x0
A, x0
B) is located below K1Q1 and the shrinking equilibrium will exist if and only if
(x0
A, x0
B) is located above K2Q2. When b is very small, we obtain Figure-3.11-a. In this
19 The ￿gures, which illustrate the relationship of f1;K;K1;K2g and f1;Q;Q1;Q2g with the change of b,
can be found in Appendix. (NE: pure strategy Nash equilibrium.)
129case, K1Q1 is always above K2Q2. If x0
A and x0
B are located between K1Q1 and K2Q2,
both of the equilibriums will exist. When b goes larger, K2;K1;K move towards 1. Since
K2;K move more quickly than K1, K2 will be larger than K1 when b is larger than 0:2264.
If b 2 (0:2264;0:3612], we obtain Figure-3.11-b. Here, for some x0
A and x0
B, there does
not exist a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. When b goes over 0:3612, point K moves
over K1 and we get the Figure-3.11-c. Here, the area in which these is no pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium increases and the area where there exists two equilibria shrinks. When
b is larger than 0:4133, K2 goes above 1 and we get the Figure-3.11-d. No matter how b
changes, we always have Q1 > Q2 > Q. When b gets close to bmax, Q1 > 0:5 and we
obtain Figure-3.11-e. However, Q2 will always be located between Q and 0:5.
The implication here is: when the the intensity of network effect is very small, the
model we discuss is very similar to the model we discuss in Section 3.2. When the network
externality is larger than a critical value, it is possible that pure strategy Nash equilibrium
does not exist in the market. However, this situation will only happen when the difference
of the initial market share is relatively large. If neither ￿rm has a signi￿cant advantage in
the number of locked-in consumers, the pure strategy equilibrium will always exist. The
possibility that the market goes to a situation where no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
exists will increase with an increase in the intensity of network effect.
Proposition 3.13 In equilibrium, the differences of output, price and pro￿t between
Firm A and Firm B increase with an increase of x0
A ￿ x0
B or b.
In all the equilibriums (shrinking or expanding equilibrium), Firm A’s advantage in
the initial locked-in consumers will enable it produce more than its competitor. Moreover,
Firm A can charge a higher price than Firm B since its product brings more network exter-
nalities to consumers. Thus, Firm A will obtain more pro￿t than Firm B. This advantage
in output, price and pro￿t will increase with the increase of the intensity of network effect,
because the network effect is the key connection between the ￿rm’s advantage in initial
market structure and the advantage in competition.
130This locked-in model with network externalties may provide some hints for social
planners and merger regulators. In network world, obtaining more initial locked-in con-
sumers could be an important incentive for the ￿rms to merge. If a ￿rm acquired another
￿rm, the buyer can inherit another ￿rm’s locked-in consumers. This will bring the merged
entity an advantage over other ￿rms who stand outside the merger. Sometimes, ￿rms may
even utilize a merger strategy to deter other competitors from getting new consumers. The
social planner should be cautious to the merger in network world, that enable the merged
entity to obtain a dominant position with the help of inheriting locked-in consumsers and
network effect.
1313.4 Conclusion and Future Work
In the ￿rst part of this chapter, we investigate a duopoly Cournot competition model with
half of the consumers in previous round competition are locked by a contract. The locked-
in effect made the density of the consumers who can freely choose service providers not be
uniformly distributed, hence the demand is distorted into a kinked function which may lead
to multiple equilibria. When the number of locked-in consumers are relatively small, ￿rms
choose the expanding strategy and reach an expanding equilibrium. When the number
of the locked-in consumers are relatively large, ￿rms choose the shrinking strategy and
reach a shrinking equilibrium. If the number of the locked-in consumers is in a speci￿c
interval, there exist two symmetric equilibria. In multiple equilibria, ￿rms prefer to choose
the shrinking equilibrium but the expanding equilibrium always provides a higher social
welfare. The model can also be extended to an oligopoly market with a similar analysis
procedure. In an oligopoly market, the possibility for the market to reach the shrinking
equilibrium decreases with an increase in the number of ￿rms.
In the second part of the paper, we add a network effect into our duopoly model.
Comparing with the model in Section 3.2, the main difference is that the previous locked-
in consumers may affect ￿rms’ competition through network externalities. We illustrate
that the ￿rm with the previous market share advantage may have an advantage in current
round competition. Sometimes, the previous market leader may even deter its competitor
from getting new consumers if the network effect is strong and the initial advantage is sig-
ni￿cant. Moreover, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will not always exist in the network
world. We found out the suf￿cient and necessary conditions for the existence of the pure
strategy equilibrium and showed that there may only exist mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium
when the network effect is strong and the difference of the two ￿rm’s previous market size
is relatively large. Since more initial locked-in consumers may bring more advantage in the
current round competition, obtaining more initial locked-in consumers could be an impor-
tant incentive for ￿rms to acquire others when the buyer may inherit the initial locked-in
consumers from all the ￿rms acquired.
1323.5 Appendix
A3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1




2 . If any of the ￿rm choose their output equal or larger
than 1 ￿
x0
2 , the price function will determined by p￿￿. From equation (3.4), we know:
p
￿￿ = 1 ￿
x0
2
￿ xA ￿ xB
It is easy to see p￿￿ is less than 0 if any ￿rm choose an output larger than 1 ￿
x0
2 . So if the
￿rms want to have a positive pro￿t, they must keep the market price positive, or we can say
they must limit their output no more than 1 ￿
x0
2 .
A3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proof of this proposition has been shown in the discussion of the three cases in Figure-










































2 < x0￿ 1
2. We can also rewrite
3
2x0 ￿ 1 in a similar way:
3
2













































2 ￿ 1;x0 ￿ 1
2).
133A3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3













2 . The reaction function

























2 in equilibrium, since there are no solution by combining equation (3.12) with
(3.15) or combining equation (3.13) with (3.14).
For any x0 2 (0; 5￿2
p
2


















6, there is no solution by substituting (3.14) into














this equilibrium, both of the ￿rm follow the expanding strategy, so the market will expand.

























6 , there is no solution by substituting (3.12)










2 . Thus, there exists unique equilibrium xA = xB = 1
6. In this equilibrium,
both of the ￿rm follow the shrinking strategy, so the market will shrink.
When x0 2 [5￿2
p
2




















By substituting (3.12) into (3.13), we can get xA = xB = 1
3 ￿
x0
6 . And from (3.48) we






2 in the equilibrium solution. Thus, the
equilibrium in which the market expands exists. From (3.14) and (3.15), we get xA =
xB = 1






2 , so the equilibrium in which market shrink exists as well. This proved that
two equilibria exist when x0 2 [5￿2
p
2
3 ;5 ￿ 3
p
2].
A3.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4















Since x0 > 5￿2
p
2
3 for expanding equilibrium, @S￿￿=@x0 > 0 for any given x0 in the
expanding equilibrium. This means the total surplus of consumers will increase with a









By our de￿nition (x0 < 1), @￿￿￿=@x < 0 for any given x0. This means the total pro￿t of



















3 ;1)istheconditionfortheexistenceofexpandingequilibrium, @W ￿￿=@x0 >
0 for any x0 which may yields the expanding equilibrium exist. Thus, we can conclude that,
in expanding equilibrium, we will have a larger social welfare if the number of the locked-
in consumers increases.
In the shrinking equilibrium, Consumer’s surplus, total social welfare and the total
pro￿t of the ￿rms are constant.
A3.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5










equation (3.20), ￿￿￿(x0 = 5￿2
p
2
3 ) < 1
9 = ￿￿, so the pro￿ts in expanding market is always
less than the pro￿ts in shrinking market. We also have @W ￿￿=@x0 > 0 in this interval, so
135W ￿￿ is minimized when x0 = 5￿2
p
2
3 . From equation (3.21), W ￿￿(x0 = 5￿2
p
2
3 ) > 2
9 = W ￿,
so the welfare of the expanding equilibrium is always larger than the welfare of the shrink-
ing equilibrium.
A3.6 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Here, wee only pride the proof for the case that i = A and the proof of the case that i = B
is similar.
If we want ￿￿
A max can be reached by Firm A, there must have:
x
￿
A 6 ￿ ￿ xB () xB 6
2(2 ￿ b)￿ ￿ ￿A
2(1 ￿ b)




If we want ￿￿￿
A max can be reached by Firm A, there must have:
x
￿￿
A > ￿ ￿ xB () xB >
(3 ￿ 2b)￿ ￿ ￿A
1 ￿ 2b




Here, M and N are de￿ned according to equation (3.49) and (3.50). From ￿A > 1 and
￿ 6 1
2, we can get 2￿ ￿ ￿ < 0. Since b < 1
2, we have 2(1 ￿ b) > 1 > 1 ￿ 2b > 0. So it is
easy to see M > N for any b, x0
A and x0
B in our de￿nition.
If ￿￿
A max and ￿￿￿
A max can both be reached, the Firm A need to evaluate which
strategy will lead to a bigger maximum pro￿t. If ￿￿
A max > ￿￿￿
A max, Firm A will choose
shrinking strategy and if ￿￿
A max < ￿￿￿
A max, Firm A will follow expanding strategy. By
comparing ￿￿
A max with ￿￿￿
A max, we can get:
￿
￿
A max > ￿
￿￿
A max () xB < ￿ +
2￿ ￿ ￿A p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
= ￿A (3.51)
When all two maximums can be reached, Firm A will choose x￿
A as its best response if
xB 6 ￿A; Firm A will choose x￿￿
A as its best response if xB > ￿A.
By the de￿nition of b and 2 ￿ b >
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) > 1 ￿ b, we have 2(1 ￿ b) >
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)￿b > 1￿2b > 0. Comparing (3.51) with 3.49) and (3.50), we may easily
obtain M > ￿ > N. Moreover, from (3.34) and (3.37), we know the slopes of function x￿
A
and x￿￿
A are all larger than ￿1 and the slope of x￿
A is larger than the slope of x￿￿
A . Now, we
136can combine the above result together and draw the reaction function of Firm A for a given
output of Firm B in the following ￿gure:
(b) (a)













Figure-3.12: The reaction function of Firm A
If ￿A > (2￿b+
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿, ￿A 6 0 and we obtain Figure-3.12-a. In Figure-
3.12-a, Firm A will only choose function x￿￿
A as its reaction function for a positive output
of Firm B. If ￿A < (2 ￿ b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿, ￿A > 0 and we get Figure-3.12-b. In
Figure-3.12-b, Firm A will choose its reaction function as x￿
A if xB 6 ￿A and choose to
follow reaction function x￿￿
A if xB > ￿A.
A3.7 Proof of Proposition 3.8
From Proposition 3.7, we know the de￿nition area of reaction function x￿
A is xB 6 ￿A
and the de￿nition area for reaction function x￿￿
B is xA > ￿B. Assume they cross at point






=) m + n ￿ ￿ =
￿A + 2(1 ￿ b)m
2(2 ￿ b)
￿ ￿ 6




(2￿ ￿ ￿A)[2 ￿ b ￿
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)]
2(2 ￿ b)[
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b]
137Since 2￿ ￿ ￿A < 0;2 ￿ b ￿
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) > 0 and 2(2 ￿ b)[
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b] > 0,
we have m + n ￿ ￿ < 0 =)
m + n < ￿ (3.52)
If we substitute m;n into function x￿￿
B :
m =
￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ n
2(1 ￿ b)
=) m + n ￿ ￿ =
￿B ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ 2b)n
2(1 ￿ b)
￿ ￿ >






(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ (1 ￿ b)](￿B ￿ 2￿)
2(1 ￿ b)[
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b]
> 0
Thus, we have m + n > ￿, and this contradict with (3.52). We can make the conclusion
that there does not exist such a O(m;n), which is the crossing point of function x￿
A and
x￿￿
B , when m 6 ￿A and n > ￿B. For the same reason, x￿
B cannot cross with x￿￿
A in their
de￿nition area as well.




Reaction of firm A
Figure-3.13: The bounded area for x￿
A and x￿￿
A .
This proof shows that x￿
A is always below the dashed line, xA + xB = ￿, and x￿￿
A is
always above this dashed line. This dashed line also seperates x￿
B and x￿￿
B . We can see that
xA +xB = ￿ divides the plane into two part and x￿
A and x￿￿
B are located in different part, so




138A3.8 Proof of Proposition 3.9
From Figure-3.9, we know that we only need to prove ￿B line is always below point O,
then we can say that there always exists unique equilibrium when x0
A and x0
B are located
in F2 area. From (3.42), we can get the xA value of point O is
2(1￿b)￿A￿￿B￿(1￿2b)￿
4(1￿b)2￿1 and
we also know ￿B = ￿ +
2￿￿￿B p






B) = ￿B ￿ xA (3.53)
Here, we only need to prove that there does not exist a pair of x0
A and x0
B located in F2 and
F3 area can make y(x0
A;x0
B) > 0. If we draw y(x0
A;x0





















By solving the function y(x0
A;0) = 0, we can get:
U =
(1 ￿ 2b)[3(1 ￿ b) +
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)]
(2 ￿ 6b + 3b2)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) + (1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ 7b + 3b2)
Combining (3.39) and the value of U, we can obtain:
U ￿ K =
2 ￿ 11b + 17b2 ￿ 8b3 + (1 ￿ 3b + 4b2)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)
(2(1 ￿ b) +
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b))((2 ￿ 6b + 3b2)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) + (1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ 7b + 3b2))
139When 0 < b < bmax, U ￿ K > 0. This means point U is always located above point K.
In a similar way, by solving the function y(x0
B;x0
B) = 0, we can get :
V =
6(1 ￿ b) + 2
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)
12 ￿ 17b + 5b2 ￿ (3 ￿ b)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)
If we substitute x0
A = x0
B into ￿A = (2 ￿ b +
p






(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)
Then, we can obtain:
V ￿ L
=
4(2 ￿ 3b)(1 ￿ b +
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b))
(12 ￿ 17b + 5b2 ￿ (3 ￿ b)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b))(2 ￿ 3
2b +
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b))
When 0 6 b 6 0:45, V ￿ L > 0. So in Figure-3.14, function y(x0
A;x0
B) = 0 is always
located above the function ￿A = (2 ￿ b +
p
(2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ b))￿ in our de￿nition area. This
means all the points (x0
A;x0
B) in F2 and F3 area make y(x0
A;x0
B) < 0 and we may indicate
that ￿B line is always below point O.
From the analysis of Figure-3.8 and 3.9, we know there always exist unique equilib-
rium if (x0
A;x0
B) is located in F2 and F3 area and the location of the equilibrium depends
on the relation between R and S. We can construct the following inequality function:
R 6 S () x
0
A >





A > ￿, we have R 6 S and the equilibrium is (3.43). When x0
A < ￿, we have
R > S and the equilibrium is (3.42).
A3.9 Proof of Proposition 3.10
From Proposition 3.9, we know that if the equilibrium (3.43) exists, we must have a pair of
x0
A and x0
B which causes x0
A > ￿. In another words, there must exist some points located
in F2, F3 area and also located above x0
A = ￿ line. We know the slope of function KJ is
less than ￿1 and the slope of x0
A = ￿ is 4b￿2b2￿1
1￿b > ￿1. Thus, the suf￿cient and necessary
140condition for x0
A = ￿ line crossing F2, F3 area is that the intercept of x0
A = ￿ is less than





2(1 ￿ b) +
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b)
= K
we can obtain that b￿ ￿ 0:3612 and is one of the solution of 12b3 ￿ 12b2 + 1 = 0.
A3.10 Proof of Proposition 3.11
If there exists a equilibrium that ￿rm A have a positive output and ￿rm B have zero output,





Reaction of firm B
Reaction of firmA
Figure-3.15: Firm A drives Firm B out of the market.
In Figure-3.15, the equilibrium occurs at point S, so we must have S > R. We can
get the value of S and R by substituting xB = 0 into reaction functions x￿
A and x￿￿
B .
























According to our assumption, x0
A+x0
B 6 1, S > R, as which we illustrated in Figure-3.15,
will never occur when x0
A and x0
B are located in the F1 area. Or we can say S < R for any
give x0
A and x0
B located in F1 area
A3.11 Proof of Proposition 3.12
141Lemma 3.1 For any b in our de￿nition area and any pair of x0
A and x0
B located in the F1
area, xS
A 6 ￿B if xS
B 6 ￿A.
Proof. From (3.42) and the de￿nition of ￿B, we get:
(2 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
6 ￿B
()
(2 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
6 ￿ +
2￿ ￿ ￿B p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
() (
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
￿ 3 + b)￿B
6 (2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)(1 +
2
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
) ￿ b(2 ￿ b))￿ ￿ 2(2 ￿ b)(3.54)
From (3.43) and the de￿nition of ￿A, we get:
(2 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
6 ￿A
()
(2 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
6 ￿ +
2￿ ￿ ￿A p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
() (
2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
￿ 3 + b)￿A
6 (2(1 ￿ b)(3 ￿ b)(1 +
2
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
) ￿ b(2 ￿ b))￿ ￿ 2(2 ￿ b)(3.55)
Since
2(1￿b)(3￿b) p
(1￿b)(2￿b)￿b ￿ 3 + b > 0 for any b 2 (0;bmax) and ￿A > ￿B, (3.55) is a stricter
condition than (3.54).
Lemma 3.2 For any b in our de￿nition area and any pair of x0
A and x0
B located in
the F1 area, xE
A > ￿B if xE
B > ￿A.
Proof. From (3.44) and the de￿nition of ￿B, we get:
2(1 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
> ￿B
142()
2(1 ￿ b)￿A ￿ ￿B ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
> ￿ +
2￿ ￿ ￿B p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
() (
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
￿ 3 + 2b)￿B
> (4 ￿ 12b + 6b
2 +
2(4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
)￿ ￿ 4(1 ￿ b) (3.56)
From (3.45) and the de￿nition of ￿A, we get:
2(1 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
> ￿A
()
2(1 ￿ b)￿B ￿ ￿A ￿ (1 ￿ 2b)￿
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
> ￿ +
2￿ ￿ ￿A p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
() (
4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
￿ 3 + 2b)￿A
> (4 ￿ 12b + 6b
2 +
2(4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1)
p
(1 ￿ b)(2 ￿ b) ￿ b
)￿ ￿ 4(1 ￿ b) (3.57)
Since
4(1￿b)2￿1 p
(1￿b)(2￿b)￿b ￿ 3 + 2b < 0 for any b 2 (0;bmax) and ￿A > ￿B, (3.57) is a stricter
condition than (3.56).
From Lemma 3.1, the suf￿cient and necessary condition for the existence of the
shrinkingequilibriumcanbereducedasxS
B 6 ￿A. FromLemma3.2, thesuf￿cientandnec-
essary condition for theexistence of the expanding equilibrium can be reduced as xE
B > ￿A.
Combining these two reduced suf￿cient and necessary conditions together, we can obtain
this proposition.
A 3.12 Proof of Proposition 3.13


























4(1 ￿ b)2 ￿ 1
Thus, @(xE
A ￿ xE





A3.13 Relationship of f1;K;K1;K2g and f1=2;Q;Q1;Q2g with the
Change of b
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